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
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PREFACE

We feel great pleasure in releasing the fourth volume of Shri Raghavendra-His Life and works, for publication. Last year we were able to publish two volumes. But this year with much effort we have been able to bring out only one volume and that too with much difficulty. It is only the special grace of Shri Raghavendra Swami through Shri Shri Sujayeendra Teerth Shripadangal Mantralaya that we are able to see the 4th volume coming out on this auspicious occasion of Maha-Samaradhana. The readers of this series, we hope, would appreciate our honest efforts in bringing out this volume.

We are now continuing Parimala and we hope to finish it in three more volumes. The subject as the readers must have found out is terse and stiff and our efforts to make it intelligible and interesting are not meagre. Yet the subtlety of thought and depth of meaning baffle our efforts and challenge our power of expression. It is only as a humble submission to the mighty Minds which know to be translated that we have been able to achieve the title we have achieved. Sympathetic and indulgent readers are requested to take things as they stand. Of course we entirely bank upon their generosity in help and courtesy in appreciation.

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Mantralayam

August 15 1973

G. B. JOSHI

PARIMALA

SHASTRAYONITWADHIKARANA

Man is not having a free and natural state of life. He is living in a state of bondage and imprisonment. This is imposed upon us by the sweet will of Parabrahmen. Hence we can get rid of this state through the grace of Him, which can be obtained by seeing Him eye to eye. This communication can be established by a course of study of the shastras through a process of reasoning and meditation all based on full dedication, unreserved surrender and perfect and self-less love and devotion.

After some general knowlede of Brahman the aspirant pursues the study for His perfect knowledge. A workable defination was found essential and the second sutra जन्माद्यस्य यतः supplies that need. Brahman is that which is the cause of creation, sustenance, destruction and other things of the universe. And this Brahman is no other than Vishnu Himself. So it was conclusively argued out that Vishnu alone is the

cause of creation etc. It is his defination because this attribute of creatorship is exclusively mono-polised by Vishnu:

Now others put forth the claims of sentient Beings as Hara and Hiranyagarbha for this creatorship and of in-sentient Beings as primordial Prakriti, on the strength of the evidence of Pashupata Agama and inferences. So the defination of Brahma is found to be affected with overpervasion.

Now Sutrakara defends the defination of Brahma as the creator of the universe, to be free from overpervasion. In order to smash crushingly the arguments of the opponent, he places his case clearly before the bar as if he holds brief for his opponent.

The opponent contends that Shiva or any other God than Vishnu can be the creator and others on the strength of Shivagama. First these Agamas are proved to be valid because they grant boons after dedicated service. Validity of the Agamas is inferred from the fact that it prompts us to fruitful activity. It is a universal rule that fruitful activity is invariably associated with statements that are valid.

Now from these inferences Shiva and others can be proved to be creators. Jayateerth goes on to state how the opponent proves that Shiva is not only creator but sustainer and destroyer, on the strength of inferences also. Earth and others have some agent to create them, for they are productions like the pot (made by a potter.) Another inference is that primordial atmos rising into first activity do require the effort of a sentient being, and so on and so forth.

Now Jayateerth removes some seeming difference of interpretation between the Bhashya of Acharya and his Anubhashya (Anuvyakhyana). For in one it is stated that on the strength of Agamas, Shiva and others are held to be creators; while the other inferences are said to prove the creatorship etc. Now this difference is reconciled by stating that in both the commentaries both Agama and inferences are stated by implication to be the source of evidences to prove the creatorship of Shiva etc.

Now Raghavendra explains how the two Sutras जन्माद्यस्य यतः and शास्त्रयोनित्वात् are to be construed into a consistent and harmonious statement without any incoherence in meaning. The first of these two Sutras runs as follows -

अस्य (जगतः) यतः (यस्मात्) जन्मादि (तत्) ब्रह्म. Here तत् is taken to be understood. It means that **That** is Brahma from which creation etc. of this world are caused. Now the second Sutra is to be construed as 'तस्यवस्तुनः शास्त्रयोनित्वात्'. "That thing has the attribute of being known only through Shastras". Hence either the Agamas or Inferences have no jurisdiction to prove the creatorship of the world. So we should not depend on them while deciding the creatorship of the world.

Now if the opponent contends that Shivagama is valid because they are the statements made by Shiva, we can reply the contention in the same coin. Some statements of Agama have been proved false. For our efforts to realise the fruit mentioned in the Agama have not borne fruit. Hence that and similar statements are invalid.

Now the opponent reminds that Madhva is only a commentator. He should not take liberty to make unwarranted additions to the text. In order to give a reply to this objection Jayateerth says that it is not an unwarranted addition. But this statement is necessary to prove that the cause of creation is only to be known through the source of Shastras or Vedas and not through

Shivagamas or inferences. Hence it is not a wanton breach of the spirit of the text, but an implied meaning which must be exposed for the full understanding of the text or Sutra.

To go back to our objection that the statements of Shivagama are invalid because some efforts in that direction have been proved futile, some of us may not like this objection at all. For in some other context of the sutras it is stated that the Vedas should not be doubted as invalid because some people do not get fruit though efforts are made as stated in the Vedas. For fruit of our efforts depends upon sincerity of them. Hence failure in getting success in efforts bespeaks some defect in that agent and not invalidity of the Vedas. So the protagonists of Shivagamas also may in the like manner establish the validity of the Agamas explaining failure in the attempts by some lapse or insincerity in the Agent.

Jayateerth faces boldly this apparent self contradiction.

He reshuffles both the arguments and reconciles them into an irrefutable and bold stand that baffles the opponent. Its validity depends upon invariable concomitance of practice and fruit then validity being proved, failure to get fruit is

ascribed to some defect in the agent who follows the practice. And when the failure to get fruit is successfully ascribed to the defects in the agent the validity of the statement that such and such practice meets with such and such fruit, is proved. Hence this argument is affected with the logical fallacy of natural dependence

If we are to follow further the progress of the course of argument we must clearly understand how the protagonist of the Shivagama argues that some part of Shivagama refers to practices which bear fruit in the life of man. Hence such statements which propogate practices of real fruit in life are considered valid and prove the reliability of Shivagama. Hence other statements of Shiva which treat of Swarga, and other invisible things are also valid. Because they are made by Shiva a reliable person. Now to come to the issue on hand, Shiva the reliable states in the Shivagama that is valid that he is the cause of creation and other things. Hence the cause of creation is not the monopoly of Vishnu.

Now it is a fact that in some instances practices mentioned in Shivagama prove abortive. So Shivagamas cannot be said to be valid. Besides the protagonists of shivagama are sailing

in the same boat with the protagonists of Hiranyagarbha agamas. Do Shivagamists admit the fact that Hiranyagarbha agamas are valid or not. If they admit them to be valid then Hiranyagarbha is the creator and not Shiva. If they do not admit them to be valid, the shivagamists cut the branch on which they stand. By disproving the validity of Hiranyagarbha Agama they disprove the validity of Shivagamas also.

Shaivas follow a very subtle course of arguments to catch the vedantin by his heels. If the Vedas also propound that Shiva is the cause of creation, then inferences based on them may prove that Shiva is the cause of creation. So how can the vedantins prove that Vishnu is the exclusive cause of creation. To this the vedantin replies that inference in collaboration with the vedas would prove really that Vishnu alone is the cause of creation without collaboration. Unaided inference can prove nothing in respect of God or Brahma.

Raghavendra in an elaborate manner disproves the capacity of inference to prove single handed that Brahma is the cause of creation. Now the inference that is presented is- "The blade of grass and other things require an agent of

creation; for they are products like the pot". The agent of creation that is to be inferred is one having the pre-requisite direct knowledge of the means of creation or one without any such attribute. If the first type of the agent is to be inferred, the instance of pot has no such qualified agent. Because the potter has no direct knowledge of Dharma and Adharma which also constitute the cause of pot. To avoid this difficulty if the attribute is shifted from the agent to the product which ultimately means - 'because it is a product of effort aided by direct knowledge of Dharma and Adharma' still the inference is not free from fallacy; because, both the reason or Hetu and Sadhya or thing to be inferred are one and the same. Same how if there is an attempt to remove this identification of Sadhya and Hetu, still it is not free from the fallacy. For the instance is not known to be a product of effort illumined by the direct knowledge of Dharma and Adharma.

In an inference the invariable concomitance or Vyapti of Hetu and Sadhya plays a responsible role. This concomitance can be of the presence of two things which is then known as Anvaya Vyapti (यत्सत्त्वे वत्सत्त्वम्) or of the absence

of two things (यदभावे यदभावः) which is known as Vyatireka Vyapti. The concomitance of smoke and fire is useful in proving the presence of fire by the presence of smoke. While concomitance of the absence of fire and absence of smoke also proves the presence of fire by the presence of smoke by the method of Reductio ad absurdum.

Now in the present case when Anvaya Vyapti enters a blind alley, the opponent argues that he can make use of Vyatireka Vyapti or a negative concomitance.

Now the point at issue is, pot is produced as an instance of a product produced by one who has visioned all the means calculated to produce the pot. But the potter cannot claim the privilege of divine sight to see Dharma and Adharma and other materials that constitute the cause of the pot. Still the concomitance of the absence of two things namely 'The quality of being produced by one who has visioned the cause (Dharma etc.)' and 'The quality of being produced by the effort of one whose desire is never suppressed'—The absence of these two is to be found in the pot; for pot is not produced by one who has visioned the cause; nor is it produced by one's effort whose desire is never suppressed.

Thus the concomitance of these two absences is fulfilled in the pot. And depending upon it it can be easily proved that the world is created by one who has visioned the cause and the production or creation of the world by one whose desire is not suppressed. But even here the attribute of the reason or Hetu is not an approved fact. Because no one in the world is found whose desire is not suppressed.

If on the other hand you delete all adjectives from the Sadhya and try to prove only that the world has an agent cause (सकृत्कत्वं) and nothing else, then you cannot prove that God is the agent cause of creation. For some other agent namely the human Soul can be that agent of creation. This is a known fact and you need not use an inference to prove that Jiva is the agent cause of the world. For among the Naiyayikas it is accepted as a theory that Jiva's destined eligibility to enjoy a certain thing (अदृष्ट) is one of the things that constitute the cause of creation of the world of things. Hence Jiva through his destined eligibility becomes the cause of creation and this is not what you wanted to prove. And your sweet wish of proving God to be the cause of creation remains unfulfilled. Hence Anumana or inference cannot prove God to be the cause of creation.

To refute this argument, Naiyayika argues that Jiva cannot be the cause of creation. For he has no knowledge of things that go to produce this world. And one who knows the things that produce a karya can be a creator.

If this be so the protagonist of the Vedas rejoins that causation in general will have to be given up. For even a potter cannot be the agent cause of a pot as he does not know all the things that produce the effect.

As a last straw to catch by a droning man the Naiyayika says that God is proved to be one who is the master or the disposer of the destinies of the Jeevas. To this the rejoinder is that this master of destinies has no special function assigned to him. God cannot be said to bring about some special excellence in Adrista. For this excellence itself is some thing in explicable. It cannot be a quality, nor can it be some capacity, neither can it be an aid to the cause, nor some thing conductive or competent to bring about the effect.

Adrist in Nyaya system is categorised as Guna. And another quality like अतिशय or excellence cannot be supposed to exist in a quality in the system of the Naiyayika. The second

alternative is not accepted by him. In the third alternative Adrista alone can do the work without any auxiliary cause. Adrista has a native capacity to turn the cause into effect. Thus the argument of the Naiyayika continues but he suffers defeat at every corner and is completely silenced. Thus no other person is required to be the final disposer of the destinies of Jivas. Hence Jiva can usurp the throne of the creator through his destiny and inference cannot prove the existence of God as a creator.

The man who attempts to prove the existence of God with the extraordinary qualities of Omni-Science, Omni-Potence and freedom of will, bodilessness, and endowment of eternal cognition and conation, is put to ridicule by proving God otherwise, by plausible arguments. A free inference moreover may land us into absurdities like proving, hornedness of horses, sky flower, and progeny of a barren woman. Therefore unbridled argument independent of Veda drags us into a wilderness and confusion of thoughts especially in the cases of objects beyond five senses. If on the other hand these inferences soundly based on self-evident Vedas vouchsafe to bestow on us knowledge of Brahman, we are really thankful.

Hence it is not proper to push forward the claims of others to be the creator of the universe on the strength of independent inferences. So the claims of inference to prove imperceptible things is denied and Shastra alone is qualified to have any say in matters divine. Hence when Brahma is defined as the creator of the universe there is no overpervasion of this definition as there are no other creators of the universe.

But this statement seems to be a flagrant self contradiction as you go back on your own words. For you began with a rational investigation and recommended study and thinking as the basis of investigation. And now you crush all free thinking by condemning independent inference. And in other works too you have encouraged inference as a source of knowledge of the author of universe, on the ground that it is the work of some body.

To this Shri Madhva says that free thinking is never recommended. Especially in the field that is beyond senses it is inference based on the Vedas that can deliver the goods. In Tarka Tandava, Raghavendra says, a fuller treatment of this subject, is to be found.

Now another interpretation of this Sutra is not found in line with the running thought of the

Sutras. The compound शास्त्रयोनिः is now dissolved as शास्त्रयोनिः यस्यतद्ब्रह्म Brahman is one whose source of knowledge is the Vedas. But it can be dissolved as शास्त्रस्ययोनिः ब्रह्म Brahman is the composer of the Vedas. Yet this meaning is found not suited to the context. For in the previous Sutra Brahman was defined as the cause of creation and the present Sutra offers a reason for Brahman being the cause of creation. By being the author of the Vedas Brahman is found to be Omni-Scient and Omni-Science qualifies him to be the author of the world.

This is Shri Shankara's interpretation and that is how he justifies that interpretation.

But the fact that Brahman is the author of the Shastras cannot be a valid reason for his being the author of the world. For there is no invariable concomitance between being the author of the Vedas and the cause of the world. Besides only one that is Brahman is there as the cause for both and no instance can be found to prove the invariable concomitance of both.

It is stated, moreover, in the previous Sutra that Brahman is the originator of the world. The Veda is included in the concept of the world. Then in the present Sutra the same thought of

being the originator of some part of the world is a meaning-less repetition.

The attempt to avoid the repetition is also futile. For the attempt to prove the fact of being the cause of the world through Omni-Science is very poor. How can Omni-Science of Brahman which is not proved by being the creator of the world can be proved by being the author of a tiny part of the world.

The attempt to prove that an intelligent cause is needed to explain the creation of the world - which excludes insentient Primordial matter from being the cause of the world-and Brahman is known to be intelligent because he is the author of the Vedas.

In ईक्षत्यधिकरण the intelligence of the world cause is being referred to and hence we find the the same idea repeated in the जन्मादिसूत्र.

The Vedas are not proved to be composed by Brahman by merely stating that he is the creator of the world. Hence he is specially mentioned here as being the author of the Vedas. But this argument also is of no use. For after all what are you driving at ? Ah your contention is directed towards proving Brahman to be Omni-Scient. This Omni-Science or all knowing can be proved

even in the case of a person who is not the creator. For even one who does not prepare a pot is found to know the pot. It is not a rule that maker alone is the knower.

While discussing in what sense Brahman is the author or creator of the Vedas, some press the theory of illusory creation into service. Just as in erroneous knowledge the snake is falsely imposed upon the rope so also we falsely see the Vedas Super-imposed upon Brahman, as grammar is Super-imposed on Panini. But the Science of Grammar is not Super-imposed upon Panini who does not appear as grammar. Such illusory appearance of Brahman as world does not prove his Omni-Science.

Brahman is endowed with faculty of cognition. This power of cognition is the source of erroneous knowledge that Brahman is the Vedas which are Super-imposed on him. These Super-imposed Vedas are means of knowledge. Hence the Locus of Super-imposition is rightly inferred to have the real power of apprehending all things. So Brahman is Sarvajna or all-knowing.

But Advaitin is not aware that this sort of argument leads to an absurdity. Just as Shastra is Super-imposed on Brahman, So also the sky

and other insentient parts of the universe are Super-imposed on Brahman and hence they must have the endowment of the power of creating knowledge like the Shastras.

Thus Brahman is inferred to be all knowing because it is the locus of Super-imposition and the qualities that are to be found in the object of Super-imposition are to be found in the locus of Super-imposition. But This argument again leads us to another fallacy. Now nescience has the power of screening and nescience is Super-imposed on Brahman. Hence Brahman also will have a real power of screening being the locus of Super-imposition. Besides Veda has power to be means of knowledge and Brahman will have power to be the agent of knowledge (knower). Hence your rule of transfer of attribute from the Super-imposed to the locus is of no use. Moreover this general rule has not been verified through any instance. So though the Vedās are the means of knowledge yet Brahman cannot be proved to be Omai-Scient and hence the way of interpretation, the Adwaitins have adopted, is not reasonable,



SAMANVAYADHIKARANA

तत्तुसमन्वयात्

Thought is a connected flow and running thought is a living current. Disconnected puddle-like thought is stagnant water. So Raghavendra appreciates Jayateertha's attempt to connect the present thought with the past. He is not satisfied with the interpretation of Sutra alone. He shows how far the previous Sutra has reached in the discussion of Brahma and how it leads to the present Adhikarana. On the final statement of the previous Adhikarana he builds a 'doubt' for the explanation of which the present Sutra should be ready. Thus a rational link is established between the past Adhikarana and the present one.

The opponent for argument's sake admits Brahma to be the only result as import of the discussion of all Shastras, which are the only sources of the apprehension of Brahma as the creator etc. of the world. But the Shastras do not yield only one import. There are statements which directly prove that Rudra or, for the matter of that, Hiranyagarbha or some Jeeva happens to be mentioned as creator.

Again in finding out the import of a statement we should not be led away by a stray

sentence. If that is so, the statement that 'The master is a handful of grass' may mislead us to think that identity of these two is the import of the sentence when it is taken out of its context. The import we settle upon should be a rational conclusion fully warranted by the whole of the passage.

So the opponent points out how the whole context is explained to mean Shiva or some one else is the creator of the world. He admits that certain passages do treat Vishnu as the creator. And all names when etymologically interpreted denote Vishnu alone and no other god. Still, the opponent contends that these means of interpretation if adopted will yield a far-fetched meaning which is after all, secondary and not primary in connotation. Words should have a chance to connote their primary meaning. We do admit that primary connotation alone will not settle the final import of the passage. But Rudra and others also command the belief of the great commentators who have brought their whole experience to bear upon the settlement of the import.

As for Narayana being the creator, the opponent removes the conflict by assigning to him

creatorship in succession. The contention of the opponent is that one should not have the licenced monopoly of creatorship. He has no objection if the claimants get that coveted post by rotation.

Now Sutra is interpreted as explaining away all these doubts and objections. The word तु in the Sutra takes note of all these contentions and yet holds fast to its former judgement. Here in the Sutra the word अव्यय is not used in its conventional meaning. It is used in its derivatory meaning and so it is etymologically derived. Raghavendra with his partiality for grammatical explanations derives अव्यय grammatically. The word is derived from the root इ with अनु to go (इण्गतौ) and the termination अच् in the sense of 'means'. Then we get the form अव्यय. It means उपक्रम and others which help us by relating the sentences to their import which is warranted by connotational power (Shakti) and syntactical import.

Syntactical import is invariably associated with these canons of interpretation (Upakrama and others). Apparent meaning and unbridled interpretation never catch the spirit of a statement. Where even surface meaning and free

interpretation are able to grasp the real import or spirit of the passage it is because they have unconsciously or instinctively followed these rules of interpretation. For import mainly depends upon these canonical directions which lead us to the right meaning without fail. These canons though many and found in different places yet import one coherent meaning without any inconsistency or contradiction.

But it can easily be pointed out that these canons of interpretation individually have failed to give us some times the real import of the composition. Raghavendra quotes many places where upakrama takes away the right spirit of the passage. In the same manner each canon is shown to mislead us in finding the right meaning.

But mere canons singly have no power to settle the right meaning. Jointly they operate to expose the right import of the passage. It is their coordinative effort that releases the right spirit of the composition. Hence Badarayana uses सम् as a prefix of अवयव. This prefix सम् means these canons must be energised by removing the defects of composition like vicinity and distance (of words). So it is deliberate consideration that

strengthenes these canons so as to yield the right meaning.

Then again we must have recourse to the specific method of interpretation of the learned known as विद्वद्भट्टि to bring about unity of meaning. Now all the Shastras form the field of investigation. They are found to have one import and that is the main import of all Shastras.

Thus with a correct application of the canons of interpretation employing the specific mode of the wise peoples' interpretation to the whole field of the Shastras, we arrive at Vishnu alone as the object of uncontradicted and unified interpretation. All the shastras come to state that Vishnu is the creator of the world and is endowed with infinite number of unlimited qualities. Thus we find the definition of Brahman as the creator of the world is flawless and useful.

By the power of the words, settled by the **specific convention of the wise** (विद्वद्भट्टी) **all Shastras** cannote primarily Vishnu and no other god though by ordinary convention of common parlance other gods and things are denoted. We must underline in this statement two pharases viz by the specific convention of the wise and all Shastras; For our ultimate aim is to prove that Vishnu is a unique abode of infinite attributes of qualities unlimited in nature.

We must induce all the Shastras to convey directly the meaning of the abode of infinite attributes by using the special and specific convention of the wise. But we should not accept the secondary power of the word (लक्षण) to prove that all Shastras convey the infinite attributes of Vishnu. For the meaning derived from secondary powers of words is not so rich and unlimited as the meaning derived from primary or original power of words.

All Shastras do not merely mean numerical inclusion of all Shastras, but all Shastras through their component parts of syllables, words and sentences severally and jointly express unambiguously that the main import is Narayana which in a nut-shell expresses the whole meaning of all Shastras. This is the flawless definition of Brahman; and he is said to be Narayana in preference to Vishnu because Narayana is an epitome of all these rich references and meanings.



ईक्षत्यधिकरणम्

Thus in the previous Adhikarama Brahma is the main import of all the Shastras by a direct reference of primary meaning. For the Shastras under interpretation, through the direct reference of the primary meaning which is settled by special convention of the wise, convey that Brahman is the sole import to the exclusion of others.

Here an objection is raised. Brahman cannot be the direct import primarily conveyed by the Shastras. For the Veda categorically confutes the idea of Brahman being the primary meaning of Shastras “यतो वाचः निवर्तन्ते” “Words get back being defeated in expressing Him” Says the Veda. Smrities corroborate this Vedic Statement. Brahman cannot be expressed in words by their primary power of expression. For this Verbal power depends upon the attributes of the referent which might be substance or quality or action or universal. But Brahman is devoid of any of these. Hence he cannot be expressed in words, and hence cannot be the main import of all Shastras. It is said in the Veda that Brahman is known through Upanishads no doubt. But this can be

explained away, by limiting the statement a little and saying that he is known secondarily by (लक्षणावृत्ति) a derivative power of the word.

Or this very objection is differently stated. Brahman cannot be the import of all Shastras. For the Vedas are infinite in number and eternal in time. It is humanly impossible to arrive at the import going through all the innumerable Vedas. It is futile to epitomise a portion of those Shastras now available; for in the portions not available to us we may get import contradicting the present one.

When thus a strong objection is consolidated, the first part of it namely that Brahman cannot be expressed in words by their primary power of expression, is refuted by the present Sutra viz ईक्षतेः नाशङ्कम्. While the second part will be attended to by गतिसामान्यात्.

So the final objection is on the strength of evidence of all Shastras you cannot prove Brahman to be the cause of creation and others of this world and to be the abode of all auspicious qualities.

Now this objection is explained away as baseless by the present Sutra. Here the word

ईक्षति stands for its root meaning namely 'Seeing', which again means 'Knowing'. Instead of saying that the word ईक्षति implies its meaning, 'Seeing', Seeing is said to be its meaning with a purpose to show that there is direct connotational connection (or lower शक्ति) between the two.

Then we come to the Conclusion. Brahman is expressible by word because he is the object of seeing or knowing. But इक्षते: has been interpreted as the agent of knowing (by Shankar). This is not in Conformity with the Shruti which the Sutra follows. 'पुरुषं ईक्षते (जीवः)'. Here clearly Brahman is said to be the object of knowledge and not the agent of knowing. Besides the form of reasoning is, Brahman is expressible by word; For he is the object of knowledge. Instead of 'Object of Knowledge' 'Agent of Knowing' is made the reason and the opponent says that "let us admit Brahman is the agent of knowing; but let us not agree with the conclusion that 'Brahman is expressible by word'" In this case one who argues like this is not reduced to an absurd position. So the reason is 'the object (and not the agent) of knowing':

In Sutra we have 'न अक्षद्वं' 'not inexpressible through word' why this round about way of two

negatives to make one affirmative ? why not 'शब्दमेव' 'Expressible in word' instead ? One reason is सूत्र is expected to follow the Shruti on which it is based. Inexpressible nature of Brahma is described 'अशब्दं अस्पर्शं'. So the word 'अशब्द' is used in the Sutra. Some go to the length of saying that the Sutra should have been 'ईक्षतेः वाच्यमेव' For 'तत्' should be repeated here taking it from the previous Sutra; and तु with तत् means तदेव and confirms the advisability of the new form of positive statement of Sutra instead of two negative statements. But all this stands refuted because Sutra should follow Shruti and Shruti says उपशब्दः.

Now if Brahman is said to be inexpressible by word what harm is there ? There is positive harm; because then Brahman cannot be the object of knowledge and it is the reason for his being expressible in words. Besides there is no invariable concomitance between cognisability (the object of cognition) and verbal expressibility. Hence Verbal inexpressibility cannot be proved by non-cognisability. For there is no sound instance through which verbal inexpressibility might be proved by non-cognisability. For all things are known to be cognisable. There is no non-cognisable thing. So one shall have to run to

negative concomitance. That which is cognisable is proved to be expressible through words. The Dharma or merit of good deeds known only by the Vedas, is expressed by the vedic words.

It is again contended that cognisibility of a thing cannot prove its expressibility. A thing can be cognised through preception or inference. But this sort of cognisibility will not lead to verbal expressibility. Is this the implication of your statement that expressibility cannot be proved. Or cognisibility is not attained through primary meaning; but through secondary meaning or implication. So this sort of cognisibility of an object will not lead to verbal expression of the object. Thus do you object to its expressibility?

The reply is simple. The first alternative is explained in शास्त्रयोनित्व and the second alternative is taken up for a suitable reply.

The contention of Advaiti melts down to this, that Brahma is knowable, though it is not expressible through the primary meaning of words. Yet Brahman can be expressed through the secondary meaning of the word. But this reveals complete ignorance of the ways of the words both in their primary and secondary

expression of meaning. A word allows itself to be used in the case of an object secondarily only when its primary meaning is ascertained and the primary meaning is found unsuitable to the context. Under these circumstances we must assume that Vedic words would express Brahman as their secondary meaning. But Brahman is not perceptible. Hence there would be curiosity to know what that Brahman is, which is the secondary meaning of the Vedic words. In this context Brahman is referred to by Vedic word and if that too is used in the secondary sense again third word should be used and this amounts to endless regress.

Now Advaitin objects that even when Brahman is expressible by the primary sense of a word this endless regress cannot be avoided. For between Brahman the object and the word which expresses it primarily there is the connotational link which requires two things to be linked. Hence the apprehension of the link requires the apprehension of the two objects to be linked.

The word is perceived by the ear; but Brahman the object is known only through the Vedas or Vedic word which again requires another word and that again a third and so on

and so forth. That is how infinite regress is found even when we admit that Brahman is expressed by a word in its primary sense. This is the gist of the objection of Advaiti against those who advocate Brahman to be expressible in words by this primary connotation.

To this the rejoinder at large is to be found in Abhimanyadhikarana. A word that is derivative or yields meaning through the meaning of its constituent parts is as good as a sentence and does not require to establish separately the knowledge of relation between the meaning and the word.

Raghavendra is very particular about removing doubts and objections that may possibly be raised in construing the text. अतिप्रसंग is such a word. This word means प्रसंग only. Yet it should not be thought that अति is Superfluous; For प्रसंग means तर्क. So the whole argument is clinched to be 'if Brahman is not expressible in words in their primary meaning then no words even in their secondary meaning can express Brahman.

Advaitin having lost every game is confounded and excited. Just as a drowning man catches at a straw, so also he takes to any argu-

ment which, he hopes, would save him. He contends that the import of a sentence is the syntactical relationship that is found between words and this relationship is not directly or primarily expressed but is secondarily expressed. Now the reality Brahman is not the meaning of a word; but an import of a sentence. And this import is only secondarily conveyed by the words. Hence Brahman, being the import, is justified in being expressed secondarily.

This contention is baseless; because just as the words primarily convey the meaning of the words so also with the same strength of primary connotation they convey the import of the sentence when syntactically related. Besides Brahman is not the import of a sentence. For he is neither relation nor is he related. A related object becomes a differentiated conglomeration and not a coordinated undifferentiated and integrated unity (Akhandā). That a judgement yields such Akhandārtha is refuted previously in Jignasādhikarāna.

We do not object to using 'words in the secondary sense, at all. This complete relection of secondary sense in any context would lead us into difficulties of syntactical construing. For

the Meemansaka has a Sutra called kundapayinam Ayanam. In this there is a sacrificial ritual which is continued for a month. and is called Agnihotra. It is not Agnihotra but it is like Agnihotra. This is the secondary sense of Agnihotra which primarily means the daily performed Agnihotra. If thus secondary sense is completely boycotted we cannot have the usage of words in secondary meaning. Hence we allow words to be used in secondary sense. But our contention is that secondary meaning is allowed only when the primary meaning does not suit the context. In the case of Brahman the primary meaning is fully justified. Hence there is no scope for secondary meaning. Shruties like यतोवाचोनिवर्तते that are quoted to prove Brahman's inexpressibility allow Brahma to be connoted primarily by such words as यतः.

Again because Brahman is ईक्षणिय or knowable therefore he must be वच्य or expressible. But the Advaiti argues that knowability is to be found in qualified Brahman but not in pure or absolute Brahman whom we want to prove to be expressible. A thing to work as logical reason to establish something must be found in the same place. Hence Madhva shows that vachyatva or expressibility and knowability are to be found in the

Absolute and not in qualified Brahman. This he shows in the next Sutra and now a proper introduction is Instituted to that Sutra.

That Introduction comprises the idealogy of the Advaitin regarding Brahman. Brahman, he conceives to be two; one is absolute and the other is qualified. The absolute is eternal pure, of the nature of consciousness, unfettered by nature and perfect. Coloured by Maya and under limitation which is false, Brahman becomes qualified, This qualified Brahman is an object of Knowledge as described in Shruti. And if this object of knowledge is inconceivable without being object of expression let the absolute Brahman remain unaffected by any of these things; and cannot be conceived as knowable, not being warranted as such, by any of the proofs. When qualified Brahman is proved to be knowable, it is qualified Brahman that is expressible.

Now the Sutrakara faces boldly this sally of arguments of Advaitin, by the Sutra गौणवैतान्यस्य नान्यत्. The knowable thing is said to be आत्मा, ब्रह्म, पुण्य and hence it is perfect Brahman or absolute Brahman and not qualified Brahman. Besides it is said this knowable Atma when approached in a spirit of unreserved surrender, leads one to

Moksha and hence the knowable Atma is Brahman of the highest order and cannot be qualified Brahman.

This same meaning is specified in the Sutra हेयत्वाच्चनात्च This Atma which is enjoined to be seen or Visualised is not mentioned as of the subordinate order or qualified Brahman. On the other hand He is accepted to be not of the subordinate order but Brahman of the highest order. But it is really a wonder that the Advaitin accepts that Atma to be subordinate or qualified which is clearly to be seen as unlike it. Such perverted minds are really rare.

A doubt is raised by the Advaitin. In the 3rd Adhyaya in the upasanapada even subordinate souls like the four faced Brahma and others are enjoined to be included as gods to be worshipped to attain Mukti or release. Hence even a qualified Atma can be resorted to find release. To this objection the answer is that they can be worshipped as the one of divine retinue and not as the principal Deity. The Brahman that is to be visualised is Vishnu, the one and the supreme. He can never belong to the subordinate order. Thus the Atma to be Visualised is unqualified (by physical attributes) and of the superior order, and hence is expressible in words.

Now another reason is adduced to prove that the Brahman to be meditated upon is not qualified but absolute or unqualified. Because this Brahman is said to merge in itself which implies that Brahman is perfect. This self-merging and perfectness are syntactically connected with unqualified Brahman alone. Hence these two reasons do not in any way warrant us that Brahman is expressible. How is it then stated that self merging is another reason to prove the expressible nature of Brahman ?

Only an intermediate step is eliminated here; and hence the confusion. That intermediate step is *श्रुत्युक्तत्वात्*. Both self-merging and perfectness no doubt are syntactically connected with Nirgunatva. But these are Shruta or mentioned in the Shruti or Veda and hence they both prove the expressible nature of Brahman.

But this explanation leads us to another deeper pit of logical fallacy. For, the main reason for the expressible nature of Brahman is that Brahman can be seen which is interpreted as 'he can be the object of cognition born of the Vedas'. Now this *श्रुत्युक्तत्वात्* which is accepted as an intermediate step is no more than the previous *ईक्षणोपरव* 'can be seen'.

In ईक्षणोपपत्तौ Brahman is cited as the object of Vedic knowledge in general; while in श्रुतत्वात् Brahman is cited as the object of the particular Shruti (पूर्णमदः) which expresses the nature of Brahman to be self-merging and perfectness. Both these reasons now lead to the conclusion that Brahman is expressible in words. Hence श्रुतत्वात् or for the matter of that स्वाप्यत्वात् is another reason for the expressible nature of Brahman. Hence there is this distinction of 'general and particular' which saves the argument from the fallacy of repetition or tautology.

This same argument should be applied in the case of the Sutra श्रुतत्वात्. Shri Madhva has already replied in his Bhashya on the Brahma Sutras that self-merging and perfectness cannot be conceived as attributes of qualified Brahman or Saguna Brahman. For Saguna cannot merge in himself. Raghavendra respectfully quotes Tattva Prakashika of Jayateerth on this Bhashya. For the colourless and pure Brahman cannot merge in the coloured or qualified Brahman. Because at the time of universal deluge do both Saguna and Nirguna remain unmerged or one merges in another? The first alternative of both remaining unmerged is not possible; For that runs counter

to the Shruti that before creation nothing was there. In the second alternative the Saguna cannot reasonably merge in the Nirguna, as he is accepted to be merging in himself. Now Nirguna cannot seek merging in Saguna. For the pure, perfect cannot get himself contaminated by merging in Saguna. This is what has been argued in Bhashya by Shri Madhva.

Shri Madhva after explaining the line of interpretation of the whole of ईक्षत्यधिकरण now gives the critical estimate of the line of interpretation of others especially that of the Advaitins. The Sutras, beginning from ईक्षतेः नाशब्दम् and ending with श्रुतत्वाच्च, comprise the ईक्षत्यधिकरणम्. According to Madhva the Adhikarana is devoted to prove the expressible nature (वाच्यत्व) of Brahman. According to Shankara this Adhikarana critically reviews the tenet of the Sankhyas that Pradhana, (and not Brahman who is endowed with Omniscience and Omnipotence) is the cause of creation and other things of the universe. For Brahman is deprived of the power of knowledge and action in general. This power of Brahman could have been inferred, had he been endowed with that, from the effects or productions produced by those two powers. But Brahman

refuses to submit himself to any change or modification. Raghavendra quotes Bhamati, the famous commentary on Shankar's Bhashya-
 ज्ञानक्रियाशक्त्यभावात् ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामिनः । सर्वशक्तित्ववित्ताने
 प्रधानत्वस्ति संभवः । (Brahman has no powers of know-
 ledge and activity and is changeless and remains
 unmodified. But the powers of knowledge and
 activity are some what possible in the Pradhana.
 For it is capable of modifying or evolving and
 is consisting of the three qualities; And can be
 explained some how to have knowledge and
 activity, as its evolutes. But Brahman is pure
 consciousness, cannot evolve himself into know-
 ledge or activity, being one and changeless by
 nature. Hence insentient Pradhana is the cause
 of the universe and not intelligent Brahman.

To this objection, according to Shankar, Sutrakara rejoins that the cause of the universe is intelligent Brahman and not primordial Matter which is insentient. For Veda does not propound an insentient matter to be the cause of the universe. Besides the cause has been endowed with the power of 'Seeing' which is compatible with an intelhigent cause. This seeing is not figurative and Secondary; for Atma is read in its context; Atma is sentient and sentient Atma

cannot be the essence of insentient Pradhana. Moreover that Atma is said to be identical with Swetaketu; And this intelligent Swetaketu can never come to be identified with Pradhana. This Atma is never used in a secondary sense referring to pradhana. For one devoted to this Atma is said to realise Moksha. So the Atma must be the sentient Atma; because he is said to be Atma the chief one and not Secondary or subordinate. In the same manner, self merging is possible only in the case of chetana Atma. Besides Vedas give us to understand consistently that Atma is the cause. This pure Chetana is some how to be supposed to possess knowledge and activity though Atma is unmodifiable.

This is the stand point of Shankar in the interpretation of ईशत्वविकरण. But this interpretation is not reasonable as it is not warranted by the wording of the Sutras. For instance the word अशब्दम् may mean 1) Beyond the reach of words 2) inexpressible in words 3) Beyond the reach of Vaidika words or 4) not expressed by Vaidika words as the cause of the universe. Sankhya Sutrakara does not admit Pradhana to be अशब्द in any of these meanings.

In the first alternative 'Beyond the reach of word' does he mean 'non-existent' or 'warranted by other instrument of knowledge'. Now to prove the non-existent nature of Pradhana, ईक्षते: cannot be adduced as reason. In the same way even the second alternative of 'being warranted by other instruments of knowledge' also the reason ईक्षते: cannot be adduced. In the original second alternative of being inexpressible in words', it cannot be argued that Pradhana is not the cause for it is inexpressible. For Brahman that is inexpressible is accepted as cause of the universe Advaitin. In the third and fourth alternatives of not being expressed in Vaidika words or not being expressed in Vaidika words as the cause of the universe, you find that Pradhana is not propounded by vedant is to be proved on the strength of the reason that it is not expressed in the vedant which reduces the argument to a silly form that X is Y because X is Y.

Now let the interpretation of the Sutra be any thing. We may concede it for argument's sake. But let us look to the context of ईक्षत्यधिकरण. it is asserted that the whole of the Shastras (तत्समन्वयात्) is to be shown as having the one import of Brahman. In this context of Samauvaya or

having the same import, 'Brahman being expressible in words' or शब्दवाच्यत्व is required to be proved first. For Samanvaya of Brahman does entirely depend upon its being expressible in words.

Shri Raghavendra gives the gist of the argument thus :- In this Adhikarana the Advaitin drags in the sankhya system as affording the opponent's view. Refuting his stand - point Advaitin passes his judgement. If so in the Vedic statement सदेवसौम्येदमग्र आसीत्. The word सत् does not allow Pradhana to be the cause of the universe; but qualified Brahman would be the modifiable cause 1) Does he interpret the Adhikarana on this line ? or does he argue out that the present Shruti would prove the qualified Brahman to be the agent-cause of the universe. 2) or does the Advaitin contend that pure Brahman is the locus of the illusion of the world. 3) ? These are three alternatives possible in the interpretation of Advaitin. A fair and critical review reveals that none of these three can stand the test of verification.

The first alternative and the second are not tenable because the qualified Brahman cannot claim to have that existence which is stated in the Shurti सदेवेदमग्र आसीत् Besides in the previous

Sutra (तत्समन्वयात्) it is posited that Samanvaya or inter pretational fulfilment is achieved only in pure and absolute Brahman and not qualified Brahman. Hence here also it is pure Brahman that is meant and not qualified. Hence the first altenative is not sound. In the second alternative there is no compatibility between the objection and the rejonder. In the objection Pradhan is proposed to be the material or modefiabale cause and in this context if Brahman is proved to be the agent-cause ther would be no consistency or compatibility. In the same manner when Pradhana is proposed as the material cause the reply that Brahman is the locus of world illusion is also not compatible, in the third alternative. Thus Raghavendra shows the direction as in chandrika which we are to follow.



Raghavendra gives us sometimes a taste of grammatical derivation. Acharya uses the word गुणार्णव with reference to Brahman, who is said to be like an 'ocean' (अर्णव) on account of the innumerable attributes he possesses. Now अर्णव is used in masculine gender. But here it is used in neuter gender. This discrepancy is explained in a highly technical manner. अर्णव must be understood as अर्णव इव (उपमानात् आचारे) is Panini Sutra and a Vartika on that is सर्वप्रातिपदिकेभ्यः क्विप् आचारेव. To all unaugmented forms by termination क्विप् is suffixed in the sense of 'behaving or acting'. Thus there is क्विप् after अर्णव (अर्णव+क्विप्). Words followed by सन्वयच् and others turn them into roots. And in the conjugational tenses the termination ति is affixed and we get अर्णवति and its genative case is अर्णवते. Now after radical form अर्णव, by another Sutra there is the termination अच् and in the place of both व there will be one व only. Hence we get अर्णव meaning 'behaving like the ocean') an adjective qualifying Brahman. So अर्णव is used in the neuter gender.



Anandamayadhikarana

Raghavendra justifies the recapitulation that is done at the beginning of the new Adhikarana. Brahman was confirmed to be the object of investigation and constant meditation. To have a clear concept of Brahman, for such mental operations, next Sutra supplies the definition that he is the source of universal creation and destruction. Suspecting some other sources of universal creation, it was proved that all such statements ultimately posit and prove Brahman to be the sole cause of creation. Now the further portion of this work (Brahma Sutra) must be dedicated to remove the objection of impossibility and impropriety of all Shastras propounding Brahman as their highest import. But Madhva says in Anu Vyakhyana that the further portions of this work are meant to explain and elucidate the theory of Samanvaya. This discrepancy is explained away by restarting the whole chain of arguments that has preceded, in the light of what follows. Brahman the object of investigation is distinctly distinguished from all other objects by giving its definition and producing evidences to that effect. When it was doubted that some evidences prove other things as the cause of creation and thus the definition of Brahman over

pervades objects other than Brahman, the Samanvaya Sutra came to the help and averted this mishap. Brahman was stated to be the sole import of all Shastras, which others cannot justly claim. But when Brahman himself was denied this exclusive claim, ईक्षत्यविकरण came to the succour and reestablished its divine monopoly of being the sole import of all Shastras. Now the investigation of an object is not anything more than the building up of its definition and its verification by available evidences. When this has been already done what purpose is there to be served by the next Anandamayadhikarana ?

This doubt is cleared by taking the following facts into consideration. We do admit that nothing is left in the presentation of the complete concept of Brahman. Still all Shastres, in their primary way of connotation, being strengthened by the help of canons of interpretation like 'Enunciation and conclusion', directly connote Brahman as their main import. This syntactical fulfilment that was announced in the Sutra तत् समन्वयात्, is taken up and established in the whole of the beginning from आनन्दमयोऽवस्थात्. Raghavendra succinctly puts the definition of 'import' as तत्परत्वं which means 'that about which

there is the statement.' Which he further elucidates as 'that which intends to import valid knowledge of an object.'

The Sutra तत्समन्वयात् simply enunciated the fact that Brahman is the main import of all the Shastras. Because all Shastras mainly and directly treat Brahman only. But another might object that a thing other than Brahman is the main import; for the canons of interpretation support the cause to be this other thing. Under these circumstances we shall have to inspire confidence in the readers that Brahman to be the cause is right because it is the most rational. But one may reasonably object why this explanation did not follow immediately तत्समन्वयात् and why was there discontinuity or diversion.

Admitting diversion but justifying it because it is purposeful it is stated that until Brahman is proved to be expressible in words he cannot be proved to be the import of all Shastras. To prove the expressibility of Brahman other Sutras like गतिसमाध्यात् and others are allowed to intervene between तत्समन्वयात् and आनन्दमयोऽध्यासात्

In the original Verse of Anu Vyakhayana the word इत्यादिना is used; and it is one word and

does not brook any stop in the body of the word while reading its letters. But the recitation of verse requires us to stop after इत्यादि and to read ना with the following word as नाध्यायेन. This amounts to a fault in Versification.

Jayateerth tells in brief how this objection of yatibhanga should be removed. Raghavendra explains that fully. Yati means cessation or stop. If stop comes at the end of Pada it does not amount to a prosodial defect called Yatibhanga. Panini enjoins in his Sutra (स्वादिषु असर्वनामस्थाने) that before terminations beginning with सु and ending with क, and not being technically called सर्वनामस्थान, a word is technically called Pada. Here in इत्यादिना, ना is a termination of this type and hence the word इत्यादि before this termination is called Pada and यति coming after Pada does not amount to a Prosodial fault, as it does not occur in the body of a Pada. Raghavendra quotes Vritta ratnakar in support of his view, in respect of the meaning of yati (यतिर्विच्छेदसंज्ञिका) yati means cessation). Then he quotes Dandin that yati means cessation at the right place in a Verse.

Now the topic of the Chapter or Adhyaya is taken up for discussion and settlement. In such a context the view of the Advaitin also is critically

reviewed and rejected as uncritical, inconsiderate and irrational.

According to Advaitins Brahman is of two kinds. One is qualified and is the meaning of words and the second is pure and Absolute and is not limited by the meaning of words. When the knowledge of pure Brahman alone leads to Mukti where is the necessity of a qualified Brahman ?

Under the influence of Avidya one Brahman is hypothetically divided in to Master and disciple worshipped and worshipper and so on and so forth. Thus upasana or worship goes on. But when Brahman sheds all the adjuncts and stands in naked absolutism and purity fit for knowledge tending to Mukti, He is pure Brahman.

All this sort of theorising is unwarranted and irrelevant. For, the reconciliation Advaitin sought, between Vedic statements of qualified Brahman and Absolute Brahman does not appeal to reason. Accepting of Qualified Brahman for the knowledge of absolute Brahman is inconsistent as both of them are diametrically opposite in nature. Hence one cannot be the means of the other.

But those who contend for one type of Brahman shall have to account for the variety of descriptions of Brahman we meet in the Vedas. All these different statements are made to find reconciliation in the unity of Brahman, in the whole of the Adhyaya. There are different basic facts on which stand this apparently irreconcilable statements about Brahman. Different types of basic facts are assigned to different Padas of this Adhyaya.

In the mean while you will enjoy to read how Raghavendra explains certain popular sayings like सार्थदपितस्करावहः 'Thieves are greater in number than the traders in the market' But the word सार्थ is in singular number and means 'a rich man'; there is nothing wrong if there be one or two pick pockets as against one trader. So in order to bring the real beauty and charm of the popular saying Raghavendra takes सार्थ as a collective noun which means "A group of traders who have met in a place appointed by them on a fixed day like Sunday or any other day for the sake of trading." If the thieves are in greater number than the whole group of traders, they are defeated in their purpose of thieving, as they are soon detected. So also if

an author indulges in diversions more than in the main topic of the book, the author will be defeated in his purpose as there will be no main-topic at all. For the diversions in composition will be random shots missing the main target.

Brahma Sutra in the first Adhyaya takes for consideration the topic of universal reference of all Vaidika words without any exception to Vishnu alone. This is known as Samanvaya which means allusion of a word to an object through its meaning. Badarayana in his Brahma Sutra proves that all Vaidika words have reference mainly to Vishnu alone. Now these Vaidika words are of four kinds : 1) Words that are known to refer to Vishnu alone 2) Words that refer to other objects than Vishnu 3) Words that refer both to Vishnu and to other objects and 4) Words that refer only to other objects. These words again are of two types : Some refer to qualities (Adjectives) and others refer to objects with qualities. (Substantives).

Now first, words connoting substantives i. e. objects with qualities like आनन्दम् and words connoting qualities like आनन्द are taken up for review. Now both kinds of words are popularly known to refer to other objects than Brahma or

Vishnu. For **आनन्दम्** is in general one who is fully blissful not any one in particular. The termination **म्** shows that blissful one is any one other than Vishnu. In the same manner words like 'Bliss' or Ananda cannot refer to Brahman who is 'blissful' or full of bliss. Hence the word **आनन्द** also is popularly known to refer to any other than Brahman.

Now Quality and qualified are one and the same; yet there is no promiscuity in the use of bliss and blissful. For though there is identity between the quality and qualified, yet relying upon some intrinsic distinction they are spoken of as one different from the other. This self-differentiating capacity of a substance is known as Vishesha and it is fully treated in the Bhaktipada of Brahma Sutra.

If attributes (**गुणः**) are shown to refer to substantives relying upon Vishesha as shown in Bhaktipada, why should it be unnecessarily introduced here in Anandamayadhikarana? To this objection the reply is that when substantives like **आनन्दम्** are successfully shown to refer to Vishnu then **आनन्द** also is proved to refer to Vishnu. For that no separate Adhikarana is necessary. But substantives like **आनन्दम्** must be

shown to refer to Vishnu and that required the present Adhikarana.

The suffix mayat in Anandamaya has been prescribed three meanings 1) identity 2) modification and 3) predominance. Now body is the modification or production of Anna or food. 'And others' includes bodies made of vitality. This body that is the product of food is like the box in which Jeeva resides. If the body is white Jeeva residing in it is called white. So also Jeeva residing in body that is the product of Anna, is called by the name of "product of Anna." So the Purva Paksha is that Annamaya and others signify jeeva or soul that resides in Annamaya body, a modified product of Anna and not Brahman as it is changeless and free from mutability or Variation.

Upon this Badarayana in his Sutras lays down that Anandamaya is Hari himself, and not Jeeva. For it is repeated again and again.

Raghavendra shows his skill in filling up the gaps left in the original. Badarayana simply states Anandamaya without any predication. A subject without predicate carries

no meaning. So Jayateerth supplies that Predicate and completes the statement, 'Anandamaya is Brahman' But this supply of predicate is arbitrary and unwarranted by the text. Hence Raghavendra justifies this filling up of the gap by Jayateerth. He admits that there is no word like Brahma in the Sutra text. Yet this Sutra is there to expand and explain the Samanvaya Sutra [तत्तुसमन्वयात्]. Therefore the pronoun तत् [that] is understood in this Sutra and in all the Sutras in this Adhikarana and in the whole of Adhyaya dedicated to Samanvaya [application of every word to Brahman in the special primary sense of the wise], That तत् means Brahman. Hence it is not wrong to suppose that the word Brahman is understood after Anandamaya.

Now Raghavendra explains the full implication of the phrase 'on account of repetition'. This means 'on account of the repetition of Brahman'. We must know in what context Brahman is repeated. Brahma is repeated in the five contexts of Annamaya Pranamaya Manomaya Vijnanamaya and Anandamaya. Repetition is there only when all Brahmas mentioned in these five contexts are taken together, but not in a single context. For though in the context of

Vijñānamāya and Anandamāya there is repetition in single contexts; yet in the remaining three contexts we do not find Brahman repeated in single contexts. This interpretation is corroborated by the statement made in Sanyāya Ratanvali that in every context Brahman has been the predicate once.

Raghavendra often quotes Chandrika in corroboration of what he says regarding certain interpretations. The discussion goes on in this fashion. Brahman is not Anandamāya. For the suffix *स्यद्* means 'effect' or modification so the statement means that Brahman is the modification of Ananda. But Brahman is conceptually immune from modification. So *स्यद्* is the first objection to call Brahman, Anandamāya. This objection includes other objections like 'otherness' 'difference' and 'embodiedness' shown in the objector's argument or *पूर्वपक्ष*. The reply to the objection of modification is that *स्यद्* means 'Predominance' and not 'modification' as the objector has taken it to mean. Now Predominance which is a reply to the objection of modification is also a reply to the objections of 'otherness' 'difference' and 'embodiedness'. All this is treated in detail in Chandrika.

Sometimes Shree Raghavendra takes cognisance of seeming irregularity in grammar. A compound word निःसीमाः is used in Anuvyakhyana. This seems to be irregularly compounded. There are two words in Sanskrit for 'Boundry line'. One is सीमन् and another is सीमा and both are feminine. Now the word सीमन् ends in न् and by a Sutra, a word ending in न् takes डीप् in feminine. Yet a word ending in मन् is prohibited from doing so. सीमन् terminates with मन् and discards डीप्. Therefore the compound should be निःसीमानः and not निःसीमाः. But Amara gives a synonym सीमा for सीमन् and निःसीमाः is a compound correctly formed according to rules of grammar, with the word सीमा which is formed with the termination डीप् affixed to सीमन्.

There is an objection raised against Anandamaya being Brahman; because Anandamaya is said to be the tail or limb of Brahman. A name for the part cannot be the tail or limb of Brahman. A name for the part cannot be the name of the whole consisting of parts.

To this objection the rejoinder is that one and the same word can be used to signify both part and whole in the case of Brahma. For Bra-

hman, being an integrated whole without any divison, has part and whole identical, with each other. According to a quotation from Aitareya different forms emanate from the original Nara-yana and Vasudeva, like different figures chisalled out from jewels, and play in cosmic activities resplendent with bright and beautiful personalities both as parts and as whole. Hence it is a paradoxical truth that both Part and whole are equally perfect and complete. Hence it is true that both Brahma and limb of Brahma are Anandamaya

But in Tapaneeya upanishad Rudra is said to be Brahma and Over Lord, or Over Lord of Brahma. So Vishnu cannot be Brahma. This meaning depends upon the dissolution of the compound ब्रह्मविपत्तिः. The meaning that is now derived is from the dissobution of the compound as Karmadharaya or Tatpurusha. It is also possible to dissolve it as Bahuvrihi. Then it means Rudra is one who has 'Brahma as his Over Lord'. If we accept this compound there cannot be any inconsistency in accepting Brahma as Vishnu and Anandamaya as Brahman.

But what is there to determine that it is Bahuvrihi and no other compound ? It is the

accent that determines the compound. Because the last syllable of Brahman is a mixed accent (Swarita) hence it is Bahuvrihi. Raghavendra explains how the accent is Swarita. Brahman ends in the termination मनिन्. This termination is निदन्त. Then the first syllable Bri is udatta or accute in accent. Then in the termination मनिन् the syllable म is anudatta grave accented or low accented or अनुदात्त. Swarita comes in the place of anudatta coming after udatta. Therefore Brahman ends in Swarita.

Therefore ब्रह्मविपति can neither be Tatpurush nor Karmadharaya. Had it been so Brahman would have anudatta accent on the last syllable and there would have been no Swarita, on the last syllable of Brahman.

We do admit that the first member of the compound has the acute accent on the last syllable; still why should it be Bahuvrihi compound? Because, in Veda, in स्वाहेन्द्रशत्रुः चर्यस्व, इन्द्रशत्रुः is a Bahuvrihi compound and in इन्द्र there is the termination रन् and hence the first syllable of इन्द्र is उदात्त and अ in रन् is अनुदात्त and these two together form a स्वरित on the last syllable of इन्द्र. Hence it is Bahuvrihi.

This refers to the famous invocation of Tvasta who begged for a destroyer of Indra, but while reciting the invocation he used इन्द्रशत्रु with Swarita on the last syllable of the first member of the compound. This Swarita made it a Bahuvrihi compound. There इन्द्रशत्रु meant 'One who has Indra as punisher or destroyer' of Vritra.

So this finally settles that in Bahuvrihi the first member has Swarita accent on the last syllable. This rule is upheld by Anushasana also. In Nayachandrika this rule is still more made clear that if both members are in masculine gender and form a compound with the first member having Swarita as accent on the last syllable then the compound is Bahuvrihi.

But the grammarians find this rule violated in places like आर्यब्राह्मणः which is dissolved as आर्यश्च असौ ब्राह्मणश्च and is Karmadharaya. Yet the first member of this compound has a mixed or Swarita accent on the last syllable. For the word आर्य is derived from the root ऋ to go with termination प्यत् and this termination is accented with Swarita. Having this termination at the end the word आर्य becomes a word having Swarita on the last syllable.

But another Sutra (समासस्य) enjoins that the last letter of the compound is udatta or acutely accented; and except this vowel all other vowels are accented अनुदात्त low. Hence the य of the compounded अयं is not accented Swarita.

This is not a sound objection. In the sixth chapter of Grammar in second section it is stated the word अयं coming before ब्राह्मण and कुमार has the accent Swarita on the last syllable. Hence in the Karmadharaya compound, as stated before the word अयं has a last syllable accented as Swarita. So there is violation of the rule that in Bahuvrihi alone the first member has its last syllable accented as Swarita. This violation is called Anvaya Vyabhichara. In Anvaya Vyabhichara the concomitance of two positives is Violated' in Vyatireka Vyabhichara it is the concomitance of two negatives that is Violated. The compound ब्राह्मचारिपरिक्वः is Bahuvrihi. Yet the word ब्राह्मचारि has the last syllable accented as udatta and not Swarita as stated above.

But really there is no Violation of the rule. For the rule that a Bahuvrihi has a first member having the last syllable accented as Swarita is a general rule or Sutra. But the instances of अयं ब्राह्मण and others are particular instances of

violation and hence the general rule is not violated.

Hence ब्रह्माधिपतिः cannot be Tatpurush compound. Had it been so the last syllable of the compound would have been accented udatta and all other syllables would have been accented Anudatta. And hence Brahman would not be Swarita as it is now recited with Swarita on its last syllable.

In Tapaneeya Shruti the sentence taken for discussion is ऋतं सत्यं परं ब्रह्म पुरुषं कृष्णार्णवम् । ऊर्ध्वरेतं विरूपाक्षं शंकरं नीललोहितं । After this we read ब्रह्माधिपतिः ब्रह्मणोऽधिपतिः । And we have settled that ब्रह्माधिपतिः the predicative adjective of Rudra is a Bahuvrihi compound and hence Rudra is subordinate to Brahman or Vishnu. Therefore in order to avoid the defect of repetition and for the sake of consistency with ब्रह्माधिपतिः the former part has one substantive and the latter part has another substantive. So the whole construction runs thus :— Sadashiva who is Urdhvareta, Shankar and Neelalobita contemplates Brahman who is Rita and Satya. These two qualities (Ritatva and Sattyatva) belong exclusively to Vishnu and not to any one else.

Brahma again is construed with Vishnu in its highest sense and in its lowest sense it may be construed with others. When a word is capable of being construed with another word in its highest sense we should not stoop down to construe it with others in its lowest sense. That is prostitution of words. And such prostitution is justified only when there is a deadlock of sense created by its use in the highest sense.

The highest sense is primary and the lowest sense, secondary. Now the whole discussion is again raked up for a critical review from another angle. And this review builds up a new objection to be refuted by the next Sutra-

विकारशब्दादिति चेन्नप्राचुर्यात्

Annamaya and other allied words do not describe ParaBrahma. For the termination मयद् signifies 'modification' and Brahma is not a product of Anna. Incompatibility of construing Brahman with Annamaya in this sense, need not drive us to accept another meaning of मयद्. For Brahman may be taken in its secondary meaning. To refute this argument the next Sutra is introduced, which is quoted above.

Raghavendra explains Panini Sutrās quoted. The Sutra is प्रकृतवचनेमयद्. Mayat termination is

used in connoting the meaning 'introduced with predominance.'

Now Shankara states that Annamaya and others signify the five sheaths of the soul. These sheaths are body that is different from soul, vitality, mind, intellect and Bliss. These bodies might be products of food. Yet Vital airs and others cannot be product of Vital airs. This shows that मयद् in प्राणमय is not used in the sense of 'product'. For Vital airs cannot be products of Vital airs. So मयद् in such a context means 'itself'. If प्राण means secondarily 'air' vitality might be the product of air. Still in such interpretation one shall have to take recourse to secondary meaning in preference to primary meaning.

अन्न is derived from the root अद् to eat. अद्यते इति in the sense of object, अस्ति इति in the sense of subject अत् is used. Then in the place of द, न is substituted and is doubled. Thus we get the form of अन्नम्.

Even then Brahman cannot be Annamaya; For, if मयद् means 'predominance' it implies the existence of nonpredominant element also. For example 'A Village predominantly inhabited by Brahmins' means also 'a village inhabited by others in less number'. But take some other

example like 'the sun is predominantly lustrous' means 'the star is less lustrous and relatively the sun is predominantly lustrous.' So also Brahman is free from misery and hence Brahman is predominantly happy looking to the little happiness of soul. Thus we can explain such constructions as Brahman is Anandamaya. Men of other Schools also admit that an adjective qualifying a substantive does not allow an adjective contrary in meaning, to qualify the same substantive.

There is a dividing principle inhering in an undivided and indivisible whole. On the strength of this Vishesha one and integrated Brahman is said to be differently Anandamaya Pranamaya and others, though remaining the same.

Again a part of a word means the whole word. भीम means भीमसेन. So also ज्योतिष्टोम is the same as ज्योतिः; For it is used so. But these are not used as synonyms. Had they been used so then राजन् and राजगृह्य also might be synonyms. But they are not so. Only by context we use one word (a part) in the place of another word (a whole). Therefore अन्न and अन्नमय are one and the same. But they are the same because essentially both are one and the same.

तद्वेतुव्यपदेशात्

Now another reason is adduced to show that Anandamaya means Vishnu and mayat means Predominance. The reason is that whatever Brahman does, he does with joy and cheerfulness which are perfect and completely unalloyed. Hence Brahman is Vishnu and he is Anandamaya.

Now for another reason also Annamaya with the other four is Brahman. भूमा is पूर्ण or perfect. Hence ब्रह्म is पूर्णसुख or perfectly happy. So he is Anandamaya.

मात्रवर्णिकमेवचगीयते

Still for another reason Anandamaya and others are Brahman. In Shruti it is stated that one who knows Brahma attains पर (ब्रह्मविदाप्नोतिपरं) which is nothing but ParaBrahma mentioned in the first part of the sentence. For पर suggests the object of attainment or realisation. And not an adjective qualifying Brahman. Had it been an adjective then 'Brahman' shall have to be repeated with पर and there is no sign of this implication. This doubt is cleared by stating that knowledge of Brhmad leads to absolution or Moksha and the object of this Moksha-yielding knowledge is Brahman alone and no other. This fact is corroborated by तमेवं विद्वान् अमृत इह भवति [one that has known him be comes released.]

This very Brahman is described in Shruti as (सत्यं ज्ञान अमृतं) of the essence of truth and knowledge and eternal (having 'no end'). This is the exclusive quality of Brahma and hence the hymnical statement that one knowing Brahman attains Para refers to ParaBrahma,

Then the question arises as to what is the form of Brahman that is known, whether it is perfect as suggested by the word Brahman or imperfect as implied by Sakshi or the knower. पूर्ण or perfectness or wholity here means all pervasiveness or immeasurableness. The form of Brahma that is known- is it imposed and found identical with Sakshi or some thing superior and supreme impelling all to activity ?

To answer all these queries the hymn or mantra states that Brahman is all pervasive and yet due to its wonderful capacity adjusts itself to the limited dimensions so that the soul might perceive him. Thus Brahman becomes immanent source of activity of all sentient and insentient.

Further the hymn makes it clear that attainment is not mere contact nor is it identity with Brahman. But it is perceiving him in his spiritual residences like Swetadweep, remaining utterly

different from him. At that time the soul is manifested with some qualities of Brahman like fully satisfied desires (सत्यकाम).

Now we must know what reference has this to the point at issue. Three qualities of Brahman are mentioned of which one is सत्य which means the principle that actuates the world to be manifested. This justifies the statement that Brahma is Annamaya and Pranamaya. Raghavendra explains the grammatical derivation of Satya to yield the present meaning. Even the five elements are galvanised into creative activity by the immanent principle of Brahman. For it is the Source of existence and activity and others. In the same manner ज्ञान and अमृत explain the fact that Manomaya and Vijnamaya and Anandamaya are Brahman.

नेतरानुपपत्तेः

So long Badarayana in his Sutras propounded who Anandamaya and others are. They are not others like soul, or body, or matter. For that entails incompatibility. No one who knows Annamaya is assured of Moksha; Hence Annamaya must be Purusha or Vishnu. And the knowledge of any other does not lead to deathless state.

From this Purusha or Hari Akasha or Sky comes out This element Sky has creations of four types. Akasha comes into existence means the physical element Akasha and the immanent deity Ganapati. Then its body (body of Ganapati) and the inner controller Hari. - All these four are called Akasha. From such Akasha Vayu is born means Physical wind its immanent God, its body and its indweller and controller Hari.

An all round survey is taken by Shri Ragha-
vendra to prove irrefutably that Annamaya and
others are ParaBrahma only. But one Purusha
is called Annamaya, yet this is Atma and
Atma is no other than Brahman. Hence Moksha
is to be obtained from the knowledge of Brahman
characterised with essential truth, knowledge and
eternity. Now Atma no doubt is referred to
jumping over elements and elemental produ-
ctions only with the excuse that words begi-
nning from Atma and ending with Purusha signify
primarily Hari only. Nor can it be objected that
Purusha or Iswara cannot have any birth at all.
For birth means manifestation in the case of
God or Brahman. This interpretation of birth
is accepted in the case of words beginning from
Akash and ending with Purusha in the third Pada

of First Adhyaya. In the same manner in the Dyubhavadhikarana Hari is said to have manifestation in the place of birth; Akasha through the convention of the wise and the highest interpretative method means Hari primarily. In the Jyoti rupa kramadhikarana, in the Sutra Kalpanopadeshat many meanings are justified, as Nigama Nirukta Nigantu and Vyakarna give meanings other than Vishnu to words through the interpretative method of derivation and convention. Thus when both Hari and other meanings are possible accepting Hari to the exclusion of other meanings is not unjust. For Hari is the highest primary meaning.

In the same manner in the Bhaktipada in the 'Arupa Vadeva Adhikarana, there is one Sutra अकाशवच्चैवैयम्. just as we say that there is no light in the house even when there is light from the eyes of persons in the house if there is no light from outside, so also, as Vishnu has no physical body though he has a body of a sort (spiritual) he is said to be a bodiless man. Because his body is super natural and different from physical bodies, he is called so. Therefore the Shruti which tells he is bodiless is still reliable.

So Annarasamaya is to be taken in its etymological meaning. Rasa is sara or essence. Anna is one who consumes all ultimately it means one who consumes most and such a one is Hari alone.

Now in Annamaya Prakarana, one who knows, Annamaya is said to get Moksha. But obtaining of Moksha is not clear here as it is clear in Pranamaya Prakarana. By extending the results of Pranamaya Prakarana, in the Manomaya and Anandamaya also, the knowledge of Brahman leads to Moksha.

तंविदित्वा अस्यमुक्तिःस्यात् one knowing him (will perceive him) and get Mukti. विदित्वा having known is perfect participle. In Sanskrit त्वा is the termination of the gerund and it is used when two actions are attributed to the same agent; the verb referring to the action that has happened prior to another is used with the termination त्वा (समानं कृतृकयोः पूर्वकालेत्वा). Here विदित्वा refers to one action of knowing and hence a verb referring to another action viz seeing पश्यता must be understood. Knowing and perceiving are actions attributed to the same agent; and of these two knowing has happened first and hence is used with त्वा. One having known him

sees him directly. Only he who knows and sees gets Mukti.

Now Shankara contends that Jiva or Soul is Annamaya for it is said to be the product of food. But Vikara or change is not of the same kind in all the five. In the first it is really Vikara or change is not of the same kind in all the five. In the first it is really Vikara or change or product; In others it is *वर्तमान* or condition which limits; just as the all pervasive ether is limited by the house; So also the soul limited by the upadhi of Prana or Vital airs is Pranamaya, and so on. These five refer to a sort of body that encases the Soul.

Besides there is another reason, Contends Shankara, why Annamaya is the Soul and not Brahman. Annamaya and others are said to have a body [residing in a body] in the Shruti. An embodied Soul will have his likes and dislikes. If Brahman were to be annamaya, he must have a body subjected to dis union with pleasures and union with pains causing great acute suffering. But God is endowed with immunity from all these things. Hence Brahma or God cannot be Annamaya and others.

So Adwaitin has come to the conclusion that Annamaya is Soul and not God. But the shea-

ths like bodies also are called Annamaya. Really speaking, the Advailin says, that the Soul alone is Annamaya on account of the limiting condition of the body that encases it. So this Annanda mayatva is not Primary but Secondary in the Soul. Now why go in for a Secondary meaning when primary is easily available. Hence the bodies of Souls are Annamaya and Pranamaya and others. In the context of purification and prayer, the meaning of body agrees better, than the Soul. Hence Annamaya and others when taken to signify body rather than Soul, have more agreeable meaning, when praying.

Annamaya is said to be Brahman. If Annamaya is Brahman Jeeva also must be Brahman. But it is very difficult to show the uncommon qualities of Brahman like 'all consumer' agreeably meaningful when applied to Jeeva. Some how by diluting the meaning of Brahman, Jeeva might be called Annamaya. Really speaking both sheaths and Souls cannot claim to possess the rare qualities of Brahman. Hence both are not eligible to be called Annamaya.

But Shankara has a fund of subtle reasoning which finds difference where there is no distinction. Here identity of Brahman and Jeeva is

meant. Those sentences which cannot yield consistent meaning when Absolute Brahman is taken, must be made to refer to conditioned Brahman to give consistent meaning. And conditioned Brahman or Soul is taken to be identical with absolute Brahman and hence the words like Brahman signify the original Para Brahman.

But this statement is refuted in Sutra वेदव्यपदेशाच्च. For all this argument hinges round the identity of Parabrahman with the Soul. But that is not the import of Upanishads (सयश्चायं पुरुषे सयश्चायं आदित्ये) Parabrahma is said to control the Souls high and low; or to reside in them.

Now the Advaitin contended that in Upanishads sentences importing the Soul were mixed with sentences importing ParaBrahman. This fact can be justified only on the understanding that Soul and Brahman are identical. But this is not true. For words like Brahman signifying ParaBrahman cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be made to agree with Soul or Jeeva. Hence Jeeva cannot be annamaya.

कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा

In respect of the identity of Soul and Brahman, there are no evidences of Perception and

Text (word). The only evidential Source to fall back upon is inference. But inference unfettered by other instruments of knowledge is licentiously free to indulge in fantastic knowledge. In spite of the opposition by perception and textual word if inference is to move, any inference may be accepted as true.

Bodies under dispute, are the seats of my enjoyment; for they are bodies; like my body. This inference proves the oneness or identity of all Souls dwelling in different bodies. But the conclusion does not even touch the fringe of the moot point viz identity of Soul and Paramatman.

This objection does not stand because the identity of different Souls various in their different bodies, cannot be sought in their gross existence. Only in their essential nature of absolute Brahman they are identical. Hence the inference eventually proves the identity of Soul and ParaBrahman.

But this inference being contradicted by Perception loses its validity like the inference which proves fire to be cold. Then a number of inferences are positively proved false by perception and other instruments of knowledge. One of these series is 'the soul is insentient, being a thing'. One may object that the inference is not valid

because the very statement that Soul is insentient is self contradictory, For Soul means a sentient abode of knowledge.

But this self contradiction is also to be found in the statement 'Bodies are my seats of enjoyment.' For they are clearly known to be seats of respective Souls. There will be no self contradiction if one's bodies past and future are taken. Hence bodies under dispute means 'bodies that are not reckoned as my seats of enjoyment' and self-contradiction is firmly established.

Advaitins also contend that inferences proving identity cannot be contradicted by perceiving difference. Because difference is unreal and perception does not convey valid knowledge. These objections are explained away not now but will be explained in future.

But if inferences are condemned wholesale then all discussions or deliberations are completely stopped. Thus there is self contradiction. For, this is a valid inference and this is not, is proved by inference only. But this objection is again explained further in तर्कप्रतिष्ठानात् and the test is that only inferences based on sacred text is considered a valid inference.

अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति

Formerly the statement that Annamaya and others are only the sheaths is criticised generally exposing general defects in such assertions. But now there is an attempt to expose the particular defects of that statement in this Sutra. In both the Anuvakas it is stated that knowledge of Brahman leads to the attainment (योग) of Annamaya and others. If these are Koshas or sheaths it clashes against a Sacred text which states that a knower of Atma gets through sorrow. But these bodies or Koshas are gates of Sorrow.

In another text there is a prayer for purification of bodies like Annamaya and Pranamaya and others. Therefore it does not matter if these indifferent contexts are Koshas. For there the sheaths are Annamaya while the things to be attained in this context are called Annarasamaya. In the remaining part it is stated that he is verily Rasa. So Annarasamaya is Vishnu, by the rule of Shabdantara of the Meemansakas. Shri Raghavendra, the author of Bhatta Sangraha is an expert Meemansaka. So he explains this rule fully for the help of the novices. The rule runs like this शब्दांतरेकमभेदः कृतानुबन्धिनात् (जं. सू. अ. २ - पा. २.) Different Verbs like

याजति, ददाति, जुहोति. are used. And on the strength of these various verbs, sacrifice (याग) charity (दान) oblations (होम) the different meanings are obtained. So also here अन्नमय and अन्नरसमय are two different words having different meanings.

In the chapter on Jyotishtoma अर्थषज्योतिः introduces ज्योतिष्टोम and is said to be सहस्रदक्षिणा. Here सहस्रदक्षिणा is predicated of the subject ज्योतिष्टोम or a different act altogether like ज्योतिष्टोम with सहस्रदक्षिणा is ordained. It is a different sacrificial act on the strength of different symbolic expressions like ज्योतिः, विश्वज्योतिः, सर्वज्योतिः. This ज्योतिष्टोम is altogether a different act. This is clearly explained in Chandrika. Here also अन्नमय and अन्नरसमय are different words and hence they denote different objects.

Some others think that here a different rule like शब्दभेदात् अर्थभेद इतिन्याय is applicable.

Henceforward Jayateerth following Acharya, after explaining the right meaning of these five words makes a critical and detailed survey of the misinterpretation of others. There is a recapitulation of the full position of the Advaitins, in order to facilitate the understanding of the students.

Now the Advaitins take this stand. The five Annamaya and others are koshas or bodies only. It is said in the text ब्रह्मसूत्रं प्रतिपाद्यम्. This Brahman, being self-important is fit to be known. So all these Sutras propound him to be so. So the first four viz Annamaya Pranamaya Manamaya and Vijnanamaya are the modified products and hence they are Koshas or bodies to encase the Soul. Only Anandamaya is Brahman because it is in the chapter dedicated to Brahman. But the four Annamaya and others though found in the same chapter cannot be counted with Brahman because something other than these is said to be Atma or Brahman. Anandamaya itself is said to be Brahman. But there also Brahman is stated to be the tail or Part of Anandamaya. In order to know this Brahman the five Koshas are described. This Brahman though a tail is said to be self dependent because it is introduced as self dependent. Anandamaya is not Brahman, only its tail is Brahman for it is stated so in the text. Hence all these five are mere bodies. The Knower of Brahman is assured to get Anandamaya because through Anandamaya he attains to Brahman. But the Sutras seem to propound that Anandamaya is Brahman. When Sutras are pitted against Vedas the stronger

dence, the Vedas, must be respected and Sūtras are weaker and hence they must be made to adjust themselves to the meaning of Vedas some how.

Here the Vedāntins follow the rule of Jaimini— विप्रतिपत्तौ विकल्पः स्यात् असमर्थत्वात्, गुणोत्पन्न्यायकल्पना एकदेशत्वात् is a rule in Jaimini (ch. IX). Shri Raghavendra explains this rule. There is a chapter called Agnishomiya Pashu. In that chapter is a hymn viz. अदितिः पाशान् प्रमुक्तत्वा. This is explained at length in his notes called प्रकाश on chandrika in Guhadhikarana

Shri Raghavendra's grammatical notes on words used either in Acharya's Anuvyakhyana or in Jayateertha's commentary on it are highly enlightening and help ful to students of Brahma Sūtra. Sometimes Raghavendra justifies the use of seemingly ungrammatical form quoting rules of Grammar and saves them from the Scandal that Vedāntins are indifferent to the use of correct Grammatical forms.

Here Acharya in his Anuvyakhyana uses the phrase or compound word पंचस्वरूपाणि which seems to be द्विगु compound and hence should be singular. Jayateerth says that it is not द्विगु but विशेषणसमास. For in grammar in the 2nd chapter in the first quarter there is a Sūtra द्विक्संख्ये संज्ञायां which is kept

functionally alive when another Sutra तद्वितार्थोत्तरपद समाहारे tells us that while tadhitārtha is there upapada comes first and Samahara compound is enjoined. And words meaning दिक् and संख्या are compounded with other words in the nominative case. Then by the next Sutra one having numerical word in a compound, becomes द्विगु. Then द्विगोः is applied and the termination डीप् is suffixed and the form is पंचस्वरूपी and the genative is पंचस्वरूप्याः and not the one that is used.

But this objection is baseless. For we do not find the requisites for द्विगु compound like तद्वितार्थ here. It is a simple कर्मधारयसमास and it can be dissolved as पंचानि स्वरूपाणि by the Sutra विशेषण विशेष्येण बहुलम्.

Now the arguments to refute Adwaitin's reasoning are given here. There is a question about the moon, on the 2nd lunar day. And what is it that is told here? Verabally expressive Anna is Brahma. Because it is given as reply to the question about Brahman. For (if a certain thing is given in reply to a question about a thing) the object of reply is the same as the object of question. This is the universal rule. This rule is not proved false in the branch. For in the Vadhbla Shakha eight forms are given; one diffe-

rent from and dwelling in Annamaya is Vanmaya; and one different from and dwelling in Vakmaya is chakshurmaya; So is Shrotramaya different from chakshurmaya; So is Pranamaya different from Shrotramaya; and Vijnanamaya different from Pranamaya; and Anandamaya is one different from Vijnanamaya. Thus eight forms are ennumerated.

A question may be asked why these eight forms were not mentioned in the present Anuvakas. Awapa and udwapa is the Vedic method of mentioning things. Certain things not ennumerated in one place are ennumerated in another place. Udwapa is not stating a thing and Awapa is mentioning a thing. By these two methods all the eight forms are mentioned in the Vadhula Shakha.

Now elucidation of the Sutra has been begun; and then the refutation of the misinterpretation of the Adwaitin is introduced. Hence there is consistency to be found, But such a breach is justified because it strengthens the interpretation of the Sidhanta. So here the topic of the Adhikarna is summed up. Now if the topic of the Adhikarana casually proves in its course another topic, it is called Adhikarana

Sidhanta. If in the course of proving the creator of the world, his omniscience is proved it is Adhikarana; Sidhanta; the other varieties of Sidhanta are Swantra Pratitantra and Abhyupagama

At the beginning of the Adhikarana it is stated that all words connoting (qualified) Substantives and qualities are to be shown to signify Narayana. This clearly notices the principle of division of the words to be connotationally applied to Narayana. But if spiritual and material words are shown to signify Narayana it would be inconsistent with the treatment at the beginning. This objection is explained by the above rule of Adhikarana. For this is a casual subject, introduced in the Adhikarana. Therefore it does not run counter to the beginning of the topic, according to the rule quoted above.

Thus all spiritual words like Prana and others and material words like Akasha and others and words like Anna and others chiefly signify Hari alone. The Sutra जन्माद्यस्यतः gives the definition of Brahman in order to prove that Brahman is the abode of all qualities. Then it was told that the definition was to be found out from the Upanishads, which declare that the application of

all words to Vishnu proves that he is the abode of all qualities. Hence they assert that all words connote, in the primary sense, Hari.

Then this definition of Brahman is easily found to overpervade the other things that are not Brahman. If only a few of the words are shown to connote Brahman, then the quality which is the meaning of the word that is non-applicable to Brahman is found in a thing that is non-Brahman and hence there is Ativyapti. Or if only a limited number of words are shown to connote Brahman in the way of the wise, then the definition of Brahman will be 'A thing of limited number of qualities' and not an abode of all qualities. And this definition of limited number of qualities is found in a thing described by a few words which are not applied to Brahman. Thus there is Ativyapti.

So all words must be made to connote Brahman. Then a quality which inheres in a thing and which is the cause of the use of that word in a particular sense, is to be found in Vishnu in unlimited measure; while that same quality is found in a limited quantity in other things and at the sufferance of God. Hence all words connote Hari in the highest convention of the wise, in the great derivative

method of the learned and worthy. All the words are not merely derivative in Hari but they are conventional also as there is constant use of all words in the sense of Hari by the highest group of the Holy. But this function of the words is not derivative-cum-conventional; but it is purely conventional.

Derivative - cum-conventional words are illustrated by such words as Pankaja or lotus. A word like Sinha or lion used in the context of a picture-Lion is the instance of formally conventional. In 'The beds are weeping' the beds in the sense of 'persons on the bed' is an instance of Secondly conventional. In these two kinds of words there is usage to a high extent and yet there is no pure convention. Hence there is the breach of the rule that there is convention where there is usage to a high extent.

But this fallacy is removed by showing that in those instances also there is convention. For though the word Pankaja connotes lotus for different reasons by these two verbal functions (derivation shows 'clay-born', convention shows 'the state of lotus') yet both have a single common sense 'Lotus' and hence it is derivation cum (Samahara) convention. (Jointly). So a new function like this is not necessary. But in Sudha

in the fourth chapter even as a joint function this is not accepted. This is confusing jumble, and an orderly arrangement is sought out of this confusion, there in the 4th chapter. Vedic words are used constantly in a sense by the learned.

That is conventional meaning. And in the case of the learned it is based on the derivation of the word. Hence it is not a combination of the two functions, but only one function.

With his sweet partiality for grammatical exposition, Raghavendra here justifies the use of वैदिका in Anuvyakhyana. By the rule of grammar it should be वैदिकी. In the sense of 'done in the Veda' with the termination ढक् changed to डीप् the form is वैदिकी (after वे is changed to vridhi वै). Hence वैदिका is ungrammatical.

But in Vedic usage all grammatical rules are observed optionally. This being vedic usage here the termination ई is not used or a termination अच् is enjoined before अर्त्त and others; and this अ is changed to आ. Thus we get वैदिका.

Acharya now concludes Anandamayadhikarana. In this Adhikarana words connoting names and symbols are shown to mean Hari by the highest verbal function. Thus Badarayana, thinking in his mind that from जन्माद्यस्य यतः the topic of samanvaya has been begun which has

strongly been based on the quality that is the cause of connotational activity, has proceeded to prove that Hari is the abode of all qualities, by proving that all words with the contents of these qualities can be applied to Hari alone in the highest verbal function. Nothing other than Vishnu can claim such universal connotational application by the highest derivative method and the convention of the wise. This rule is applicable in the instances with the power of extension to similar contexts.

If this is so, in अन्योत्तर आत्मा आनन्दमयः, Anandamaya is Vishnu alone according to the rule 'when two meanings, one principle and another subordinate are available the principle is chosen in preference to the subordinate' Anandamaya alone is that. Why then adduce a reason for it (as in आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्) like अभ्यासात्?

But this sort of objection is not sound. For we know according to the rule quoted above that the chief meaning of Anandamaya is Vishnu. But we don't understand that the context allows the import that Vishnu is Anandamaya; this is provided by the reason अभ्यासात्. This is made clear in the commentary on व्यायविवरण [in the next Adhikarana].

End of Anandamayadhikarana.

Antastadharmopadeshadbikarana

If all that you have said in Anandamayadhi-
karana is true then all words easily get themse-
lves applied to Hari according to the highest
convention of the wise. Hence no further eluci-
dation is needed in respect of this topic.

Besides words like Indra and others have
'wealth' and others as the cause of use which are
found in fairly unlimited quantity in Indra and
hence these are used according to the highest
derivative method and the convention of the
wise. Now Indra and Brahman are one and
the same. And hence Indra may be said to have
unlimited wealth which forms the cause of the
word Indra being used to denote the king of he-
aven. Hence it cannot be said independent and un-
limited wealth cannot be found in more than one
person. Statements and symbols of Indra have
the same subject for them. Now what is 'having
one and the same subject'?

Jaimini says 'If the subject is one it is said
to be one sentence. All the words that propound
one subject are said to be one sentence. One-
ness of meaning or import does not constitute
the cause for oneness. But if a word is deleted
and if the sentence suffers in meaning on account

of the absence of that meaning then the group of such words. constitutes 'Yeka Vakyata'. For instance in 'the pot is' the words form one sentence. For the sentence has only one subject. Again if you remove one word the sentence will miss it. But then 'Pot is' and 'pot is' form only one sentence; beause there is one subject, though they are actually two. Therefore Jaimini inserts विभागेसाक्षात् चेत् if words are deleted the sentence is affected. Then when one 'pot is' is deleted there is no साक्षात् at all. Hence there two do not form one sentence. Now if only विभागे साक्षात् is enough to make one sentence अष्टवर्षब्राह्मणमुपनयीत । तमध्यापयतीति will form one sentence. For if any group is deleted meaning is affected. So the former part is essential and that is एकार्थं. Here there is no एकार्थं or one subject. There are two subjects.

Some commentators on this Sutra take अर्थं to mean purpose. Then भगः वाँ विभजतु, पूषा वाँ विभजतु are really two sentences. But the purpose is विभागः; and hence let them be one sentence. Then they add साक्षात्चेत्विभागे स्यात्, and there is no साक्षात् or affecting of the meaning if one part is dropped. Hence these are not one sentence, but two sentences. If only साक्षात् चेत् विभागे, is there and

no एकार्थत्व, then where there is no common purpose there will be many sentences.

In this Adhikarana there are two Sutras and on the strength of the inferential sign, internal residence (अंतस्थत्व) all words denoting names belonging to the class of deities shall be shown applicable to Hari according to higher derivation and wiser convention. His seed of creation is in Brahma, Stretch over the waters of the deluge, sleep over the milky ocean, are the unerring qualities of Vishnu. On this ground the one residing in the cavity of the heart also is Vishnu.

In the Second Sutra भेदव्यवदेशाच्च अन्यः the objection based on the theory of monism that Indra and Vishnu are one and hence Indra and others are the inner residents and not Vishnu, is refuted on the ground that Vishnu is said to be the Atma or Soul of Indra and hence different from him. So Vishnu alone and not Indra is the inner resident.

Some here (Adwaitins and the followers of Ramanuja) interpret these two Sutras as establishing the truth of a statement made in chandogya. In that Upanishad 'A golden figure is seen in the Aditya', 'the figure that is seen in the eye'.

and so on. This inner dweller is God Himself. But this is refuted by the word 'only'. If this had been so, in the coming pada the अंतर उपपत्तेः would be redundant.

Now begins Akashadhikaranam in which the word Akasha denotes not physical sky but Vishnu as required by the context. While settling this question the topic of predominance and recessiveness is settled while settling the meaning of a word. Here we must settle the meaning of Akasha. Akasha means Akashana or 'making scope for'. Then Akasha by this derivation means the physical sky. In sacred and temporal literature; Akash means physical sky. Amara mentions Akasha among the synonyms of the sky. In Veda Akasha is said to be born of Atma.

In settling the meaning of a word, Shruti is more powerful than Linga. Shruti is direct statement and Ling is the invariable sign. Even a number of such signs cannot be more powerful than Shruti. But they will not be equal also. For, that which is naturally strong can never be superseded by the number of the weak. Powerfulness is of two types; one is by nature and another is by number. This powerfulness by

nature is superior. Thus it is said by the author of Brahmatarka quoted in Tattvavinirnaya. For the strength of number is artificial and strength by nature is natural. Strength by nature is born strength and hence superior.

This will settle the relation ship between this Adhikarana and the previous one. The two Adhikaranas are connected with the relationship of succession (one coming after the other). For at the beginning of this Adhikarana, the validity of the reasons adduced in the previous Adhikarana is called in question and on its refutation the objection is built up. So from Antastha to Akashadhikarana the relationship is technically called Pratyudaharana and is a form of succession.

So long it was argued that Akasha is Brahman because akasha has the unfailing sign of Parabrahman; and nothing is said refuting objections of the Purvapakashas which showed that physical sky was the only meaning or Akasha by derivation and convention; and not Brahman. The method of refuting it, is that Akasha means ParaBrahman by the higher derivative method and the convention of the wiser. Nothing of this is mentioned in the Sutra. So Sutra is interpreted so as to give this meaning.

To remove all doubts, it is said Narayana is one having Parovareeyastva; Jayateerth himself defines परोवरीयस्त्वम् as निरुपचारितसर्वोत्तमत्वं. In the Chandogya Bhashya this same thing is defined as. परस्मादुत्तमं प्रोक्तं परो इतिततः प्रोक्तं । परोवरं परं तस्मात् प्रोक्तं परोवरीयकम् । It is not mere superiority; for that is mentioned by ज्यायान्. And to mention परोवरीयस्त्वम् after ज्यायान् is futile. or It is not even परिमाणाधिक्यम् or excessive measure which is connoted by ज्यायान्. A thing that is superior to the already superior is परोवरीय.

Narayana is said to be possessing all the qualities of the five elements. They are the qualities of maintaining, of satisfying of burning, of drying and of affording space. All these qualities in their unlimited form are to be found in Vishnu. Now giving abundant space is to be found in Narayana and that too he is free and independent in the disposal of space among living beings.

Here there is a little discussion about the derivative method or योगवृत्ति, which is of two types. 1) one is full and free control over the quality that is the cause of the use of the word; And 2) another is abundance of the quality

that is the cause of the use of the word. Of these two the first type is to be found in the disposal of space by the Akasha. The second is found in the space-giving of Narayana, which is abundant in him.

The qualities of the five physical elements are to be found in the insentient things inhering in the lifeless matter. How can these be at the disposal of others, when they form the natural constituent part of those lifeless things. This will be explained later on.

Pranadhikarana

In this Adhikarana which is called Adhyatma Adhikarana through the Samanvaya (Connotational application) of Prana to Vishnu, the Samanvaya of all words meaning Atma is sought, on the strength of unique characteristic found only in Hari.

Now on the objectional side Prana is said to denote the chief Pranadeva and not the effects of Vayu like breathing they being insentient. Hence the objectional side only limits itself to Pranadeva and not breathing and others though connoted by the word Prana. Besides there is

frequent usage of Prana in the Veda in the sense of chief Pranadeva.

Formerly in the previous Adhikaranas Samanvaya is sought through the great derivative method and the convention of the wise. Here there is a greater doubt. For Prana to mean Jeevana there are strong grounds. For there is invariable concomitance both positive and negative between मुख्यप्राण and जीवन. There is life where there is Mukhya Prana and where there is no Mukhya prana there is no Jeevana. Hence by Prana, Jeevana is meant and not Vishnu. For there is no such invariable concomitance between Mukhya Prana and Vishnu either positive or negative. Hence प्राण means Mukhya Prana and not Vishnu.

When this objection is raised the reasons adduced before, will again be called for operation and therefore the Sutrakara says अतएव 'for this reason'.

Now life and activity are invariably connected with the effect of vaya. But there by you can deduce that Mukhya Prana is the cause of Life and activity. Because the body of Mukhya Prana is the effect of Vaya. A Potter's body is invariably

connected with the pot, and hence the potter's body also is the cause of the pot. Hence because Mukhya Prana has the body which is the effect of Vayu, Mukhya Prana is invariably connected with the effect of Vayu.

Suppose that as there is invariable concomitance between Mukhya Prana and the effect of Vayu, so also there is invariable concomitance between Hari and life and activity. Then how should we determine the question of Samanvaya of Prana. Then Prana should be taken in the sense of 'cause of enjoyment'.

The objection side is made still more strong by showing that reason also upholds that Mukhya Prana is Prana and not Hari. That reason is that Mukhya Prana is one who actuates all the duties of the senses. So even the convention of the wise does not support the idea that Hari is the Prana. For the convention is based on the derivative meaning which is now shown to prove that Mukhya Prana is Prana because he actuates the senses.

Now the refutation begins. Like 'being the husband of Laxmi' and others are signs of Narayana very strong in indication. The quality that is

the cause of the use of the word viz actuation or प्राणन is chiefly to be found in Hari. For Hari is the person who actuates Life which is under the control of Prana. Therefore Hari is the Prime actuator of all.

Raghavendra discusses reading of श्रीहृत्ते which is cited as हृरीहृत्ते in Taittareeya shakha. But this reading of श्रीहृत्ते in another shakha which is similar to Taittareeya as found in the Bhashya. Here the sign of 'husband of Laxmi' is unique and is never connected concomitantly with Hari. That form of Rama which is found to grace the chest of Narayana is Shri; and that on the Knee of Narayana is Lakshmi. Shree and Lakshmi who are mentioned in the previous sentences are his wives. This condition of being the husband of Lakshmi and Shri is not to be found in any other than Narayana.

In order to prove that Hari is the cause of Life there may not be invariable concomitance between the two; still it may be proved. Just as heaven is possible to be recovered if not by Agnihotra or keeping holy fire, at least by a dip in the Ganga so there will be no negative concomitance like "no Agnihotra, no heven".

Then if Hari and Prana were both causes of Life how is Hari the greater cause of the two ? Because both Shruti and Positive and Negative concomitance are the evidences to prove this fact. It is told in Shruti that both Prana and Apana are found resorting to Hari. And it is also told that Hari impels even Mukhya Prana to action.

Mukhya prana in both his forms of Prana and Apana is found resorting to Hari. Mukhya-prana is the body of Hari. Hence the invariable concomitance of Mukhya Prana with his life has reference to Hari only.

Again the negative concomitance between Jeeva and Hari is difficult to be proved. For if Narayana is not there, there is no life at all. But a condition in which Narayana is not existing, he being found every where and at any time, cannot be conceived. Then in the state of life Hari's form is not at all manifested we may very well say that in the absence of Hari there is absence of Life:

Prana is said to be actuating the senses and affording all souls enjoyment and hence the the objector argued that Mukhya Prana was

Prana and not Hari. This actuating the senses and affording enjoiment to Souls are chiefly found in Hari and not in Mukhyaprana. For Hari impels even Mukhyaprana to activity.

Here certain schools introduce some other vedic texts for discussion. Here is some Shruti from Chandogya 1st Adhyaya and Udgeetha Prakarana. A certain sage named Chakrayana goes to the Sacrifice of a kiag; and parades his knowledge before him. He says- "oh! Prastoti! If you praise before me that devata who is praised in the special hymn, without understanding her nature your head will be down." Then the Prastota asks him what that devata is. Then Chakrayana tells him that it is Prana and that all beings enter into him at the time of Universal deluge.

Now if this is the sentence taken here for discussion there will be no objection and refutation sides in this.

But it is objected that surely a doubt would arise. For both in Sacred and profane literature Prana is found used in the sense of Vayu. But Prana is not used in the sense of Vayu when he is called Deva. Only a sentient being can be called देवा and a presiding deity over the Hymns.

Besides Prana is said to be the cause of birth and destruction which amounts to an un-failing sign of Brahman. But even Mukhya-prana is attributed with the quality of affording exit and entrance to senses; the elements are the essence of the senses. The elements enter into Prana and the senses also through them, enter and make exit.

But this entering and exit of senses in Prana is not proved by evidences. If inference is invoked as evidence the inference in its syllogistic form is of the following type— The activity on Prana or Devata has become the substratum of Production and destruction of the activity of the senses. For even when Senses stop their activity Prana does not stop his activity like the lump of earth which is the substratum for the production and destruction of Pot. In sleep we find the senses not working; yet Prana is active.

This is not accepted; For perception cannot ascertain the imperceptible senses entering Prana. Even if we admit it what next? Is this an inference or is it a probability. Prana is the substratum of the production and destruction of elements. For senses are the essence of the elements

and Prana 'is the support for the production and destruction of Senses. There is a general invariable concomitance thus : He who is the support of the essence of certain things, is the support for those things, also. But there is a breach of this rule. For a spider has its threads as essence from its body. So the spider which is the support of the production of threads that are the essence of itself, is not the support of the production of spider itself.

Again an objection is raised. The sentence of Prastava states that Brahman is not the topic of Prastavan. According to the interpretation of others this Prastava states that senses merge in Mukhya Vayu and Brahman. So the import of the whole of Prastava is Mukhya Prana and not Brahman. There it is asked who is the goddess. The answer given is Aditya. Again the deity is asked and again the answer is Anna. Thus Shruti tells something other than Brahman to be the topic of it (Anna or Aditya). Similarly Prana is something other than Brahman.

Jaimini instructs in respect of interpretation that there is doubt only when there is nothing to decide one of the alternatives to be the meaning. Here Aditya and Anna are not determined to be

something other than Brahman. Hence there will be no decisive objection-side. But अन्नं प्रतिहरमाणानि (let food be eaten up) cannot be said to refer to Brahman (for Brahman cannot be eaten up). This doubt is cleared up. For Brahman alone is eaten up. (अद्यते अतिचभूतानि). Hence no objection can be raised; nor is there any doubt.

So the statements chosen by others are not the topic sentences of Adhikarana. But Acharya who has dived deep into the secrets of Vedas, who is an adept in the interpretational Logic, cites the topic sentence to be तद्वैत्वं प्राणोऽब्रह्मः which unmistakably points out Brahman to be its content. For it is corroborated by Prastava and Udgeetha Vakya of determined import (Brahman.)

Chandodhikaranam

or

Gayatryadhikaranam

In this Adhikarana we find Samanvaya of all words meaning Vedic hymns or prosodial metres through the Samanvaya of the word Gayatri in Brahman. This Adhikarana comprises three Sutras. Gayatri is not treated here in its individual merit but as a type of the class of words meaning Vedic metres like 'Ushnik' and

others. Gayatri is chosen as a type of the group because Gayatri is the mother who gives second birth to all the higher three classes.

Now the reasoning also [why Gayatri connotes Vishnu in the highest primary sense of the wise] is the old one that was applied to the words like Indra, Akasha, Prana and Jyoti on the ground that they participate in the unique quality that is found in Brahman. This unique quality of Brahman is that the words connote some meaning which is abundantly found only in Brahman or which is controlled and managed by Brahman.

But Gayatri means the doer of गान and ज्ञान. He is the propounder [of things] and protector [of students from sins]. How do these two qualities exclusively belong to Vishnu? These two belong to Veda which is said to be नित्य and अनादि. What is अनादिनित्य? Veda is said to be so because it has no independent author [अपौरुषेय] and अनादिनित्य is said to be nothing more than अपौरुषेय. [Tattva Nirnaya Tika]. It is not immutability or unchangeableness [कृत्स्न]. For क्रम in Veda [succession] is something born or produced. This point is raised and satisfactorily answered in Chandrika.

To this objection the rejoinder is as follows : it was objected that that which was eternal cannot

be controlled by any body. But the reply is that his capacity covers all kinds of things-eternal, noneternal, natural and acquired. Other wise God cannot claim super sovereignty. Even the nature of a thing which is self-existent is controlled by the eternal capacity of Brahman. This is also corroborated by textual evidence, like द्रव्यं कर्मचकाळश्च and others.

From ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् with three Sutras a new Adhikarana is formed, object some. But this is wrong for अथयदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिः दीप्यते here no चरण is mentioned. But in चरणाभिधानात् चरण is mentioned, to show पाद. This contention lands us into a new difficulty. In भूतादिपाद व्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्च, पाद is mentioned and that will be redundant, and hence the whole सूत्र is a repetition.

But it is contended that there will be no repetition. For there is difference of purpose. In त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि, a heavenly figure is referred to. The same figure is described in यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिः दीप्यते the same figure is described here as ज्योतिः connected with heaven.

Jyoti referred to in यदतः परं is Brahman only. For (in the Mantras like इदं सर्वं भूतं येषां पृथिवी or यदिदमस्मिन् पुरुषे शरीरं or यदिदमस्मिन् अंतः पुरुषे हृदयं,) भूत, पृथिवी,

शरीर and हृदय are the four padas of गायत्री. If here गायत्री is mere metre and not Brahma we cannot construe these four Padas with Gayatri. But Gayatri is Brahman and as Brahman is all comprehensive Gayatri can be said to have four Padas. Hence on the strength of these four Padas we say Gayatri is Brahman. (Is the meaning of मूलादिपाद व्यपदेशात्)

प्राणस्तयानुगमात् Prana is already discussed in the previous Sutra. If new context requires new enquiry the investigation of import will be endless.

But Prana here is cited with senses like eyes, ear, mind, speech and hence this Prana cannot be called Brahman.

The reply is that प्राणो वा अहमस्मि ऋषे is called इंद्रश्रुति. and Prana is Indra on account of many determining signs and words which convey the meaning of Indra. The contextual evidence is strong and unfailingly convey Vishnu in the principle sense. For Brahman is repeated often and often.

The subject Samanvaya is rounded up here with certain general remarks and observations

about the subject of Samanvaya. First it is observed that Samanvaya is sought through primary connotation and not through Secondary implication. Reasons are adduced to prove this in ईक्षदधिकरण.

From Narayana emanate the four forms of Vasudeva Sankarshan Pradyumna, Avirudha. In all these Padas it is Narayana with three forms that is primarily connoted. He is connoted not only in the Sutras but also in each Adhikarana and in each Sutra and in each word and syllable. Of these different forms one will be settled to be the meaning for the present on the basis of the deciding reasons, words, statements and so on. All these things are understood by men according to their capacity of understanding.

The Bhashya of Acharya no doubt intends to present only a partial aspect of the huge meaning which the Sutras are capable of connoting. Because Acharya wants even men of little understanding to know something about the Sutras. The manifold implications of Sutras pregnant with rich ideas of uncommon meaning are gathered from Brihattantra.

Even when Anuvyakhyana touches only the fringe of the endless meaning of the Sutras, it

has inherited to some extent the manifold implications of the original. So also Bhashya is teeming with high thoughts and deep significances. Those are only men of versatile genius who have understood the significant suggestions, purposeful implications and noble thoughts of these two works of outstanding merit. Raghavendra justifies justly his indulgence in revealing in different places, various meanings and implications.

Thus all Vedic words substantives signifying other meaning yield high meanings through derivation are not polluted with repetition. As all vedic words signify Hari with a variety of attributions through primary connotation, Hari is proved to be the abode of innumerable essential qualities. This is the principal definition of Brahman.

The end of the first Pada of the first Adhyaya.

II Pada of the I Adhyaya

The topic of this Pada as distinct from the previous and the forth coming Pada is the Samānvaya in Hari of all Vaidic words which signify quality. (लिंगात्पदम्) This also establishes consistency with the past and the next Padas, with this Pada. Here consistency means one ness of the subject treated as shown before.

Now words that were shown to connote Hari in the previous also were of the nature of signifying quality; then how to show the topic of this pada to be distinct from the previous one? Here words should be taken in their apparent meaning. For instance all words are derivatively connotative in the eyes of the learned. For every constituent part yields meaning to the learned. But to the common man some words are conventional and some only are derivative. From the point of view of common man this division is made. Hari is shown to be the chief primary sense of such words.

The first Adhikarana in this Pada is called Sarvagatatwadhikaranam. (treating ubiquity or omnipresence of Brahman). Some like Mayavadins or Ramanujēeyas think that this Adhi-

karana treats of meditation of Brahman as Manomaya. In Chandogya it is said मनोमयः प्राणशरीरः मास्यः of Brahman. सर्वल्लु इदं ब्रह्म All is super imposed on Brahman. So one bereft of attachment and hatred should take to meditation on him. This is said to be the subject matter of this Adhikarana. This is the contention of Mayavadin.

But this is not proper. For in Meemansa it is stated that what is told in the beginning is true and is accepted in preference to what is told at the end. Therefore Brahman's nature of being manomaya which is mentioned in the beginning cannot be set aside by सत्यकामत्वं of Brahman which is told in the end. Yet the last mentioned sets aside the first mentioned. For the first mentioned is adjustable [सावकाश] while the last mentioned is non adjustable [तिरक्काश] in any other way. Therefore the last sets aside the first. This is the meaning of (आनर्थक्यप्रतिहतानां विपरीतं बलाबलं)

If this rule of adjustability and non adjustability were to settle the principle of Badha (setting aside the meaning) how to show चक्षुर्मयत्वं in जीव? These signs of चक्षुर्मयत्वं and others are to be found in Brahman. Hence it will not be possible to maintain the objection side that Jeeva-

alone is चक्षुर्मय. Adducing another reason the objection is maintained and चक्षुर्मयत्व is only shown there as an additional reason. Hence in the body of the Sutra on the side of objection the Soul has a little place allotted and is चक्षुर्मय and others as an additional reason. As an illustration Jaya teertha quotes an instance. तत्तज्जएक्षत here ईक्षण is repeated to show it to be 'formal' or Gauna. Therefore in तदक्षत also the ईक्षण is formal. This doubt is cleared and ईक्षण is proved to be real by quoting the context of Atma (अनेन जीवेन आत्माना): Repetition has no value when there are decisive qualities. Thus it has been disproved in गौणव्यवहारात्मशब्दात्. Yet in अतएव प्राणः, कतमा सादेवता, आदित्य इति होवाच in respect of आदित्य and चतुर्मुख there is repetition. Hence Prana in Prastava is not Brahman. He is some one like Mukhya Prana. Thus they show the objection side. Here also the same is the case. Though this is disproved in ईक्षत्यधिकरण yet this repetition is resurrected to add to the strength of the reason given by objection side. That is how Vachaspati defends the reasonableness of his objection side.

Now what is the propriety of treating the ubiquitous nature of Brahman in this Pada? In the Sutra विवक्षित गुणोपपत्तेः the Shruti सर्वभूतेषु

ज्ञ is referred to. Brahman is able to actuate things at a distance by entering into them and galvanising their power to act. This is mere sport to the powerful Hari. This sportive tendency of Hari distinctly proves his omnipresent nature. How does this subject help to prove Sarvagatatva or Omnipresence ? This connection is shown in five ways.

Still when his all-sided existence is treated naturally the treatement of his existence inside everything is redundant by the rule that the smaller is included in the greater. Yet to say that 'one every where is inside the moon' is simply silly. But this objection is met with the statement that immanence is quite compatible with ubiquity as in the case of ether or Akasha. While commenting upon एतद्भावमिदं all the words that connote 'existence in some representative bodies' are included here in. There existence in-side some is illustrated by the sense व्योमवत् and means only immanence in some only, and not all.

Now by सर्वेषु भूतेषु एतं if Hari is attributed with all pervasiveness like that of Akasha, then his existence in little space (as in अर्धकोकस्त्व) becomes incompatible with his all pervasiveness. So Here

he is not stated to be all present or omnipresent in the Shruti सर्वेषु भूतेषु एतं. Some minor deity like Aditya perhaps is meant here. That is the objection side.

A bit of Grammer is taken up for discussion and settlement, by Raghavendra. तत्तच्छक्ति प्रबोधकः is a compound which must be dissolved as शक्तेः प्रबोधकः (awakener of the power). But this is against rules of grammar. For a word ending तृच् or अच् meaning agent is not compounded with a word in the genitive. But such a compound is allowed in the case of words like याजक and पूजक. So प्रबोधक might be included in this group and a compound (genetive tatpuruṣa) might be allowed as solved above. But प्रबोधक is not mentioned as included in the group of याजक. So finding this explanation unsatisfactory Raghavendra explains the grammatical irregularity in another way नदिगृहिपचादिभ्य ल्युगित्यदः Before roots like नदि and before ल्युगृहि and before लिणि, पच्, अच् comes. प्रकर्षेण-बोधयति (intensively teaches). In this meaning the preposition प्र is prefixed. Then अच् is suffixed in the causal sense. Then after some modification it becomes प्रबोध. In the meaning of 'not known, the termination क is suffixed and it becomes प्रबोधक. 'This awakening is not known by others'

is the meaning: The compound is dissolved as शक्तीनांप्रबोधः शक्तिप्रबोधः ततश्च अज्ञातः इतिकप्रत्ययः

In this Adhikarana we get the third Guna Sutra [fourth Sutra in order] namely कर्मकृतव्यपदेशाच्च. Here there is a Shruti introduced य एत आत्मानं परस्मै शंसति and the meaning is 'He who teaches this [known as चक्षुर्भय] Paramatman to an unfit person, will lose all benefits of Vedas: In this Shruti the all pervasive Atma is 'the object [कर्म] and the embodied (शरीर) is the subject. Therefore the सर्वगत is not the embodied Soul.

Is this Subject and object relationship compatible with difference or identity between them ? The objection side is set aside accepting difference between Subject and object. But there is no invariable concomitance between difference and Subject and object. For Subject and object may be different persons or things, or they may be the same persons. But in Anuvyakhya it is said that difference between the two is naturally settled. And hence its implication must be rightly understood. So accepting the meaning of the Sutra as explained above difference between Subject and object cannot be accepted as settled.

So the alternative that they are invariably different is refuted. For subject and object may be found as identical.

But there is some difficulty in accepting the view that they are identical. For the subject is one who is benefitted by the action of the Verb. (In रामःगच्छतिग्रामं) the Subject gets the benefit of going. But the object is one which gets the benefit of the activity of the Subject. The activity of going in Rama results in the reaching (संयोजन) of the village.

These definitions of Subject and object are not acceptable. According to this definition even the place left by Rama is benefitted by the fruit of the action shared by Rama. For in the sentence देवदत्तः कौशांब्याः पाटलिपुत्रंगच्छति Kaushambi receives 'Separation from' (विभाण) by the fruit of the activity of going of Devadatta. Therefore the Sentence would be देवदत्तः कौशांबीं पाटलीपुत्रंगच्छति which is not sanctioned by usage.

Besides in sentences where Past and future verbs express the activity as in देवदत्तः ग्रामंगतः [or गमिष्यति] the village has not yet been benefitted [संयोग] by the activity of Devadatta and hence it cannot be used in the accusative.

Suppose we limit the definition of कर्म only to कर्म of the Verb in the present tense [घटं अहं जानामि]. Even that is not found workable. For the verb 'to know' does not produce any effect like ज्ञातता in the pot. For no change takes place in the pot if that is known by any body.

So we must ultimately accept the definition of Subject and object as "Subject is the main source of the activity of the verb." [क्रियास्वातन्त्र्य] and "object is the object of such activity."

Hence subject and object might be one. For there is no incompatibility between the two. If so it becomes very difficult to find one and the same, being subject and object in the same sentence. But we actually find one and the same, being subject and object "I know my self". is an instance. The same you find in the case of कारकः. (The meaning of the case). कांक्षयाभ्या भुक्ते or कांक्षयाभ्यां भुक्ते.) Here the same pot is both the 'means' and 'support' of eating. In the same manner the subject and object also may find the same person as their support or Ashraya.

Still the diehard insists in proving difference between subject and object on the plea that invariably subject and object are found one different from the other; and there is no violation of this rule.

But we cannot establish Vyapti or invariable concomitance between two things only on the ground that they are found together. There is also breach of this rule to be found. मां अहं जानामि 'I know my self'. Here the subject and object are one and the same. If one is not to know one self then self realisation would be impossible.

But self or soul is never directly perceived or visualised. It is only inferred. If at all Atma is directly realised or experienced it is believed by the Naiyayikas that Atma never becomes the object of cognition but he is mentally visualised. or According to Prabhakaras Atma is the substratum of self luminous knowledge. Both these explanations of self-realisation are not correct. For in the first instance self is brought to the level of experience to all. In no way can he be hidden from us.

Now let us consider the belief of the Naiyayika. He says that Atma or self is to be known only through mind. Yet the self is the subject of experience and not its object. For he shines in the cognition of ego or I. And this is the basis of self-realisation. But if this self-cognition does not have self as its object it is

something strange and is not explained. We do not come across with knowledge which does not figure its object. It is the I in "I am blind" that figures the object of that experience. An objectless cognition is a contradiction in terms, "I am happy" is a cognition in which I is not the object. It only mentions happiness. Hence there is no experience which warrants the existence of self.

Then there are experiences of the type of 'I feel pleasure' 'I feel pain' which will be the only type of self experience according to this theory of self cognition and there will be no such experience as 'I know my self'.

There is another theory in vogue which explains self realisation thus : Self is a single unit and appears as subject and object when it appears with different distinguishing adjuncts. So self is a qualified thing. Is the qualified the same as the adjective and the substantive or is it different from those two. So long the first alternative was the basis of our discussion.

If the second alternative is accepted then the subject is the receptacle of knowledge (self) and the object is one who has happiness (I feel happy).

Then there is partial identity. And again when one falls into meditative trance he experiences unqualified pure self, (is his theory). Then he cannot maintain that the object is one who has happiness.

Now the third theory is put on the table for dissection This is the theory of Prabhakara. One afraid of a scorpion is said to run unluckily into the reach of a poisonous snake. Prabhakara meets this same fate. He does not accept one and the same to be subject and object in a sentence. Because he defines them as already noted with qualities which distinguish one from the other. But really speaking they may be one and the same. But the object is quite different from क्रिया or activity. And in order to avoid the contrariety between the subject and object he goes to accept the oneness of क्रिया and कर्म whose contrariety is universally accepted.

Now क्रिया is said to be produced by the syntactical relation of कर्म existing between itself and कर्म. Hence cause and effect cannot be one and the same; for one precedes the other.

Another thing to be noted is knowledge and its relationship with expression in words. (व्यवहार) It is a rule of common vocal expression that what is already known is usually talked about. Suppose there is the talk about knowledge itself; then knowledge must be the object of knowledge. Thus knowledge becomes object of knowledge. Thus we come to the conclusion that one knowledge is both activity and object. Therefore we shall have to reject the theory that knowledge knows itself

But knowledge cannot know knowledge yet it may give rise to vocal expression to that effect. This seems to be reasonable. For there is the expression in words like लंबकर्ण मानय which means "Bring long-eared man." Now लंबकर्ण is a Bahu-vrihi compound and means as noted above 'Long eared one' Here without cognising long-ears there is the expression 'bringing of long eared one'. So it is not reasonable to say that if one is to be expressed in words it must be cognised.

In order to meet this argument Jayateerth observes that there are two types of Bahu Vrihi compound; one is तद्गुण संबिज्ञान and another is अतद्गुण संबिज्ञान. The first type is a compound in which

the adjective is attributed to the other which is referred to by the Bahuvrihi compound. लंबकर्ण is of this type. Long ear too is referred to even in the compound. Hence the rule that that which is known is expressed stands good.

The self was said to be known as the receptacle of knowledge, but not its object. Even this theory is not free from logical error. Self or Atma is not the object of optical knowledge. For it has no visible form and magnitude like the sky. But if the self were to figure in the optical knowledge as its object really it must possess visible form and magnitude. But if the self were to be mere receptacle of such knowledge it need not go in for these qualifications.

But really speaking a thing figures in knowledge only as its object, not as its receptacle. Atma does not figure in optical knowledge because he has no visible form and no magnitude.

Now take the cognition of a pot, in such pieces of knowledge, as 'I know the pot'. If it is contended that Atma does not figure as receptacle in this knowledge how does this optical

perception present Atma in that knowledge? It is Atma who settles the configuration of pot-knowledge. So it cannot be 'this is a pot' but it can be 'I know the pot' So we find Atma boldly figuring; hence Atma shines there as object of knowledge. Thus in 'I know my self' 'I' is both subject and object. So if subject and object relation is invariably associated with intrinsic difference we cannot explain the experience 'I know me'.

But the relation of Subject and object is generally based on their difference. But exceptionally they are found one. Thus we are able to remove two objections: one was how to account for such cognitions as 'I know my self' when we accept subject and object as different? If not in आत्मानं परस्मै शंसति how to explain subject and object as different when we do not admit invariable concomitance between this relationship and difference between the two.

We should not object to the general rule being hemmed in by an exceptional rule. Because the relationship of subject is inner and that of object is outer. To be more explicit subject resides where kriya or activity resides.

While object resides there where activity has produced some effect. This makes the exception possible.

But the general rule refers to the class (जाति) or universal 'Killing' (हिसाब) (in 'Killing in general of all animals is prohibited'). But exception (In अग्निषोमीय killing is allowed refers to a single individual. Once when man is burnt to ashes why is he revived into man ? Thus in वैशेषिकाधिकरण the concept of universal is condemned as existing consistently in one and the same form in all individuals. So there is no scope for 'general rule and exception. You will find general rule and exception re-established in that Adhikarana by stating that the concept of similarity contrives to maintain 'general rule and exception'.

But this general rule exception concept does not stand the syllogistic reasoning. For animals in general are prohibited from, killing is the general rule. Agnishomeeya animal is to be killed is an exception and that is actually the violation of the general rule. If the सार्वत्रिक (all animals) is not to be found with सार्वत्रिक even as exception there is the व्यभिचार of vyapti [violation of the invariable concomitance]. So to maintain the

identity of subject and object on the ground of being exception is really illogical. But this point is well argued out in Bhaktipada. Mere व्यभिचार does not affect the operation of व्यप्ति and only निरुपाधिकव्यभिचार undermines its power of operation. It is dealt with in detail in Bhakti Pada.

It was announced in the beginning that in this Adhikarana ubiquity of Brahman is being considered. Now a doubt arises whether that is the only topic that is dealt with or some allied subjects also are included for treatment? other topics are implied. In Particular places like अंतराधिकरण, the present methods now established after full deliberations are made use of, in applying Indra and other words to Narayana through the quality of 'residence in Chandra'.

If there is an additional doubt about a topic already thrashed out it is taken up again. Now in the coming Attadhikarana there is an additional doubt which is cleared in the next Guhadhikarana. Hence the topic once treated will not render the next Adhikarana redundant if the same topic is treated will not render additional doubt.

In order to prove the merit of universal applicability of the Sutras on the strength of

the previous Adhikaranas the coming Adhikaranas of Antara and Antaryami direct the Samanvaya of some activity. The activity in Antara stands explained in Antaryami. But this is not the real justification. The real justification of these two Adhikaranas lies in the fact that a new doubt is being cleared in the Sutra that follows the first Sutra.

The word Vaiswanara is derivative and connotes Hari through his Ling or Sign. But it is also said to be *परम्परिक* or conventional. If the latter is true, Vaiswanara is against the general drift of this Pada which is mainly concerned with samanvaya of words signifying characteristic sign. So how to include it (*वैश्वानराधिकरण*) in this Pada ?

In the first Pada dedicated to samanvaya through words signifying name the Sutrakara takes to Ling Samanvaya because by so doing he proves many names applying to Hari. So also here by showing the Samanvaya of Vaiswanara through name the Sutrakara achieves Samanvaya of many signs or Lingas.

But this is not the only objective before the Sutrakara. The name Vaiswanara is the topic of the Prakarana. But the signs are the characteristics of Vaiswanara. The name is directly

connoted as the primary meaning of the word Vaiswanara. The characteristic signs are secondary and less extensive and hence the Samanvaya would be stronger through the names.

But this is strongly objected to. For in order to prove the universal applicability of the Sutras, the name Vaiswanara mentioned in the verse which collects the topics of the Adhikarana is shown to apply to Vishnu with the characteristic signs which belong to Vaishvanara. This is a wrong stand point. For Vaishvanara Adhikarana will thus lose all claim to universal application. This argument is met with the argument that Vaiswanara includes words of names like Agni-Vayu and others which distinguish one Vidya from the other and one Sukta or hymn from the other.

Attadbikaranam

The textual statement taken for discussion in this Adhikarana is one according to some while it is another according to other commentator. Now our Acharya in his Bhashya quotes सयसदेव असृजत् तत्तदत्तुं अधियत् सर्वं अतीतददितेः अदितिस्त्वम् । The objector construes and interprets this :— “God mother Aditi made her mind to eat up whatever she has created. She is called Aditi because she eats up all.

Now others have taken another sentence for discussion. यस्यब्रह्म क्षत्रं चोभे भवत ओदनः । मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचन कश्चावेदयत्रसः । He to whom all the world comprising Brahmana and Kshatriya becomes food, thinks Death to be ghee to dress food. In the first statement that is stated to be eater directly. But in the second statement the eater is known inferentially through the words ओदन and उपसेचन. But ओदन and उपसेचन invariably do not suggest secondarily अत्ता or eater. For they imply also भोक्ता and संहर्ता (Eater and destroyer). Hence Acharya has chosen the first sentence.

It was stated in Anandamayadhikarana that whatever is made to apply to Hari through higher connotation in this Adhaya, is the definition of Brahman. And in the defining Sutra [जन्माद्यस्य यतः] it was solemnly declared that the definition being a quality of Brahman is identical with him. And in this Adhikarana [सर्वगतत्वं] activity is shown to be the sign of Brahman and it is applied to it. This activity includes such activities as 'eating' 'Internal control' 'Enjoyment' and others.

Raghavendra adds the activity of movement. But such activities are not characterised by eternity; they are evanescent. Hence they are

not compatible with eternal substances like Brahman. In Chandrika the concept of unchanging Brahman is shown to be compatible with the changing qualities like eating and moving. Here also in the context of elucidation of 'क्रियाशक्त्यात्मना' the point is partially discussed and a statement is made that there is no evidence to prove the absence of movement. If the changing cause creates the changing world then the cause also being a changing one must be caused or produced. The cause of this caused cause must be one among the changing world, which is an impossible thing. Hence Brahman must be an uncaused cause or eternal. So how can an eternal and non eternal be one and the same ?

A reply is attempted in Bhaktipada. Even this activity, as every thing that inheres in Brahman is of the nature of Brahman. It is not some thing above or apart from, Brahman.

Hence the activity of destruction is not temporary. It is of the same unchanging nature as Brahman. The changing nature of activity is not perceptible by senses, like Brahman. No concomitant sign also is available. Hence it cannot be inferred. The very nature of acti-

vity lets us know that it is ever changing and dynamic and not static. Then the question arises 'what is activity?' Activity of God is either the root meaning (like knowing, eating of the root to know, to eat) or it is vibration or tremor. It is not the root meaning. For knowing, desiring, trying, though root meaning, are not temporary but staying forever. Nor is it vibration for all activities are not of the type of Vibration.

Now God's activity is temporary because neither before nor after it is not exposed to view though there is no cover to hide it nor any obstacle to hinder it (from being exhibited). But even if the Vibration of God is eternal and unchanging yet its manifestation is temporary and hence the activity also is temporary. Here, 'Before and after it is not found observed' is made the reason to deduce the conclusion that God's activity is temporary in nature. Before and after not observed- is it by perception or by evidence in general? If it is fit to be observed and if not observed then it is अक्षय. But it is not proved that God's activity is perceptible. The second alternative does not stand, because Veda like ज्ञानं नित्यं क्रियानित्या वोचसाते to prove the eternity of activity of God.

Nor can it be argued that God's activity is because it does not yield any fruit. For it cannot be conclusively proved that in no way the activity of God is fruitless. Constant absence of fruit or result or occasional absence of fruit are the two alternatives. In the first case in the qualities like 'form' in the aquatic atoms there is no constant union and division; yet there is no transiency, so there is break, of rule. Thus in eternal qualities, we do not find that they are the constant cause of eternal union and eternal division.

The same breach of this rule is to be found in the universal [सामान्य] or class and the sky. There also you find constant union and division not being created and yet you find no transience as you find eternity.

Eternal qualities are never seen to produce union and division as कर्म or activity is required as accidental cause [असमवायिकरण.] But the agent cause of God's will has been able to produce eternal union and division [here, by eternal quality, we mean the form or रूप in the atoms of water.]

The second alternative is occasional failure to produce the fruit or result like union and division.

In the instance of sky we see the breach of rule. There in the sky we find concrete objects like pots and others producing occasionally union and division and yet the sky is not non-eternal [निरास्य]. Now we should not contend that the sky also constantly produces union and division; for at the time of universal destruction there are no unions and divisions.

After a prolonged dispute Sidhanta comes to the conclusion, after a detailed elucidation of असमवायिकारण and its functional nature which will be taken up again, that क्रिया which inheres in Brahman and is one with him is nothing but the potentiality of Brahman tending towards production. This activity in the potential form is Brahman and in his essence eternal. This potentiality becomes an actuality when it becomes manifest and perceptible. This actuality conduces to its productivity. This notion of divine activity is free from all logical flaws and defects.

Then follows a long discussion about this potentiality and actuality or manifestation. Now what is manifestation of this Potentiality? Becoming cognisable is manifestation. Now when seen from God's level this activity is ever

manifested and hence eternal. Now all logical flaws as stated before, cling round this explanation.

Now this activity of God seen from other's stand point is never manifest to them. For the power of activity being essentially divine is beyond the reach of human ken. Even if known, this cognition has no role to play in the production. Hence manifestation is not even removal of the cover. But Manifestation is merely a state or condition of divine Potentiaticity: It means Potentiaticity when creation becomes manifestation.

Now do you mean to say that even at the time of creation destruction is there? If so why is it not mentioned like that? Really speaking destruction is there at the time of creation, but only potentially and actually. For the expression in talk we do require it to be manifest. Unmanifested never becomes the topic of talk.

To go to the basic conception of divine potential power becoming manifest (Potent and manifest) it is the will of God that is at the root of this. Hence the question is whether his 'will to destroy' is constant and coexistent

with 'will to create' or not. If it is constant, as there is nothing to stop its operation, why not destruction constantly. If this will to destroy is occasional and not constant, destruction being dependent on this will, requires another will to create this will and so on. If on the other hand destruction is not dependent on the will to destroy, then other destruction also is not dependent on this will. Hence all the logical flaws stick to this conception.

It is admitted that there are many internal innumerable particularities in the very conception of manifestation, Destruction and its will affect each other. Destruction creates some particular in its will and will creates some particular in the destruction. This particularity is nothing but one affecting the other and colouring the other with one's relationship.

The activity of destruction belonging to Parameswara having for its Source divine knowledge, will and effort is constant and eternal. Even then this activity becomes effectual only when it is accompanied by the auxiliary cause. But this explanation is not satisfactory. For even this auxiliary is eternal and depending

upon the Divine Will. Again it may be argued that not mere (unattributed) is the cause of destruction but 'will to destroy' (संजिहीषी)

Now the qualities like will and others may be occasional or constant. Occasional will cannot be attributed to destruction if constant destruction should be constantly happening. On account of all these logical inconsistencies we shall have to fall back upon the idea of Potentiality and manifestation.

For will to destroy being constant is found co-extensive with the constant will to create. But both wills are potential or only latent. When there is will to destroy there is destruction and when there is will to create there is creation. Hence there will be no promiscuity. The same is the case with divine activity. Hence the concept of will is free from logical inconsistencies.

In God we do not find activity of the type of tremor or Vibration. For he is infinite in extension (महत्परिमाण). This argument may be met with equally strong argument viz. God is having vibration, for he is of middle measure or of infinitesimal measure.

Shruti announces God to be of all size and shape. (अणोरणीयान् महतोमहीयान्). It may be objected

that contrariety in qualities of the same substance is found logically unacceptable. Infinitesimality being first mentioned in Shruti may be accepted.

Thus God's activity has two aspects one is latent and another is patent. But they are compatible and not contrary. Both of them being aspects of Brahman are one with him. Yet by their inherent distinguishing nature (विक्षेप) they have the power to be talked as different from, though essentially one with, Brahman.

Now what evidence is there to prove the existence of activity of Brahman? If activity belongs to a perceptible thing then the activity is perceptible. For, seeing an animal moving we see moving and we have the experience of it.

But some think that activity is not perceptible. For in a moving thing nothing is perceived but Separation from the first place, and union with the second place. The activity of going (गच्छति) is inferred from this perception of separation and union. This imperceptibility of activity is authorised by the perceptibility of nothing more than separation and union. But this is not reasonable. For activity is not revealed only by the union of the second place. It is also revealed by the separation of the first place and this

separation is perceptible; and hence activity which is simultaneous with separation is also perceptible.

Besides, the inference that activity is imperceptible is contradicted by the realisation of second thought [अनुवृत्त्या] that activity is perceptible. [I see a cow going] Inference also may be cited as evidence to prove the perceptibility of motion or activity.

It is agreed that form is perceptible. Even that may be proved false by such unbridled inferences as Form is imperceptible; because it is form like the form of an atom. More in detail this topic is thrashed in Vaisheshikadhikaranam:

If it is argued that union and separation are perceptible not each individually but collectively as the army or the Forest. I cannot perceive an army from a single horse rider. So also a single tree does not give us the percept of a forest. If so, activity also might be perceptible in its collective form though individually it is imperceptible as in the case of union and separation.

Besides a Pseudo inference like "Threads are not perceptible but the piece of cloth is perceptible" may go against the perceptibility of threads.

Thus goes on this argument in all its details. Till at last it is proved to the hilt that activity in a perceptible substance is perceptible.

गुहांप्रविष्टत्वाधिकरणम्

This is a small Adhikarana consisting of only two Sutras. Here the sign in the form of activity like 'reaping the fruit of activity' is shown to agree with Paramatman in the highest connotational sense. The Shruti taken for discussion is ऋतपिबन्ती which introduces two as drinking 'rita'. The question is "who are these two"? They are Soul and Paramatman, say the objection side. But the Proponent says that the two are the forms of Hari. Because we find among the attributes of these two, unfailing signs of activity which becomes agreeable with Brahman.

Ramanujeeyas think that four Sutras from अत्ताचराचरग्रहणात् comprise a Separate Adhikarana.

We find no hints regarding the Subject-matter, the doubt and its dispelling. Hence to make good that omission here they are formally introduced.

Now the objection side argues—

The dual number shows two and hence the Soul and Brahman are meant by ऋतपिबन्ती. In

Anandamayadhikarana it was propounded that one Brahman was five in form and hence the number five was proved not in compatible with one Brahman. Here also one Brahman, in the same manner may be argued to be of two forms. But this interpretation is taken recourse to only when there is clear contradiction. But here there is no such contradiction or Badha, when Jeeva and Iswara are posited as two. Besides 'Put in the cave (of heart)' can be meaningfully applied to both Jeeva and Iswara.

Really speaking there are no words signifying multiplicity in Brahman that is a unique unity; so that 'one in many forms' need be accepted to avoid inconsistency, in Anandamaya sentence. But in Bhashya the conciliation is sought with the expression (बहुवचनम्) 'is one with multiple forms'. Hence we had to run to this explanation. So the intention of Bhashyakara (Acharya) is this that if any one raises the objection against the multiplicity of Brahman on the ground of its unity, the hypothetical answer is बहुवचनम् or multiplicity of forms. All this is fully thrashed out in Chandrika.

Besides, according to objection side, Brahma cannot be reconciled with 'reaping of fruit of

Karma' as he is immune from the clutches of Karma. So on his side as both Soul and Iswara are accepted the reaping of fruit can be made to agree with one of them Viz Jeeva. This is similar to the usage of 'Men holding Umbrella go' even when some have no Umbrellas at all.

Here again the Shruti that gives the meaning of the termination (showing dual) as important and that Shruti which shows unity shown by the stem word as unimportant is not a right course. For the Shruti connoting dual number has not the flexibility of adjusting in some other manner. If on the other hand ऋत्पिबन्तो is shown to refer to Brahman alone, both the stem and termination cannot be justified in their references.

Now Sidhanta side puts forth the argument that even one (thing or person) can be shown to be compatible with two (number). This is shown by the Sutra विशेषणञ्च which is the second Sutra of this Adhikarana. The incompatibility between Positiveness (भाव) and negation (अभाव). For two-ness is not the negation of oneness. Nor is it the relation of Killer and Killed. Because such relationship is compatible with co-existence. For one unborn cannot Kill the other that is existing. Nor one living in another place. So

the mouse and the cat found in one place for some time at least are seen to assume the relationship of Killer and Killed. Again the incompatibility between the two cannot be the absence of identity. For this amounts to mutual negation which is compatible with co-existence. Mutual negation amounts to difference or Bheda which tolerates co-existence.

ऋतं पिबन्ती introduces things in twos; but further यः सेतुः (that is the bridge) qualifies those things without disturbing their twoness. It need not be objected that one of the first two is selected and qualified by oneness or identity. For there is not to be found a unique attribute residing in one and yet distinguishing both from others; or there is not unique quality which distinguishes one of the two to qualify it. This second alternative does not suit the occasion. For it is meant to contradict twoness as it is coexistent with oneness. Thus this singularity must be proved to show its distinguishing nature and unless its distinguishing nature is proved its singularity cannot be proved. Thus there is the logical fallacy known as mutual dependence.

Now Mayavadin represented the objection side as Intellect and Soul and came to

the decision that it was Soul and Brahman. This interpretation also is shown to be false. For we began the discussion with the enunciation that Brahman is one who is fit to be referred to by all words. In this context Jeeva and Iswara are found undesirable.

But if there is contradiction context may be set aside. As there is no such contradiction context may be respected in interpretation. Duality is found running against context no doubt. But duality also goes against Jeeva and Iswara Side. For they are one and not two. Imaginary difference between the two is enough for the use of dual no doubt. Then why not say that God in his infinite power assumes two forms and these afford sufficient ground for the use of dual number.

A little objection is raised against the use of एकत्ववचनेन. It is contended that it must be एकवचनेन. But it is said the termination गु shows एकत्वसंख्या. This use of abstract noun in respect of number is regularised in grammar.

अंतराधिकरण

In this Adhikarana 'Activity like enjoyment (abstract quality) is taken up for discussion

and is shown to be with one who is the inner resident of the eye. There are five Sutras in this Adhikarana.

Now both activity and abstract quality are said to be shown in one who is the resident of the eye. But Sutra mentions only abstract quality, in अंतर and no activity is meant by the Sutrakara. For अंतर is अतः only

But really speaking the word अंतर means both activity and enjoyment, and abstract quality. For अंतर is the combination of अतः and the root र्म् to enjoy. Now this र्म् is followed by इ (according to the सूत्र- कर्तरिङ्मन्तात्ऽ) in the sense of agent. Then by चुट् the इ is dropped and then र्म् is also dropped. Thus we get the form र and we get अंतर

Then a long discussion is instituted to show that अंतर does not become अंतर by the dropping of र coming after र and lengthening the Vowel before it. For the र is not due to the dropping of र and hence no question arises of lengthening the foregoing अ.

Had it not been the opinion of Sutrakara to mean both activity and abstract quality, he would have said only अतः उपपत्तेः and thus he would

have achieved brevity. and it would have been a feather in Sutrakara's cap.

“य एषो अंतरक्षिणिपुरुषोद्भूयते” and “एष आत्मा इतिहोवाच” are the Shrutis cited. Sutra also has the credit of following Shruti. But in the first Shruti Brahman is said to be one in the eye, and not one enjoying. This meaning is supplied by the word आत्मा which is derived from the root दा with आ and the root मा. आदेयं उपादेयं सुखं or सुखसाधनं माति one who enjoys happiness or means of happiness

Now here one objects that in the Shruti only the word अंतर is used and not अतः. So in the Sutra we find अंतर in the following Shruti; and not the word which yields the meaning of activity and abstract quality. This objection is not strong. For you have no grounds to think in this manner. The reading of Sutra can be accounted in another manner. Besides there is nothing to add. Besides अंतर should have been used in the place of अतः in the Sutra अतस्तद्वर्मादेशात्. For the topic sentence chosen by others contains (in the Shruti) अंतर. (य एषोतरादिव्ये and others). So we should accept the word अंतर from Shruti and also from Sutra and then etymolgically splitting it into दा with आ and मा (आदेयमाति) is the right sort of derivation.

Now चक्षुरंतस्य is proved to be Parameswara by the Sutra सुखविशिष्टाभिधानात्. The two words सुखविशिष्ट and सुखि are different though they have the same meaning. Besides there should not be any consideration of brevity or otherwise in the synonyms. There how it is hinted that there is brevity ?

There should be no consideration of brevity or otherwise when words are synonyms by convention and not by derivation. In the present context the word सुखि by convention shows 'possession of happiness' but the word सुखविशिष्ट by only derivation means 'possession of happiness' and not by convention. So the question of brevity or otherwise rises up as it is between two words whose meanings are derived one by convention and another by etymological derivation

In प्राणोब्रह्म कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म Brahman is said to be 'happiness' But in the Sutra he is said to be one 'with happiness' सुखविशिष्ट means perfect happiness' विशिष्टं सुखं in the fashion of कं ब्रह्म. Suppose the Sutra had said only सुखाभिधानात् then the Souls also possess limited sort of happiness and hence there is happiness and there is no ब्रह्मत्व and hence the general rule suffers a breach.

Then the question of the dissolution of compound is taken for consideration. विशिष्टं चतसृखं Then there is पूर्वनिपात and the compound is विशिष्टसुखविधानं. So the Sutra should have been विशिष्टसुखाभिधानात्.

But Sidhant tries another dissolution. 'सुखेन विशिष्टः विशिष्ट means श्रेष्ठ. In the Bhashya विशिष्टसुखवत्त्वात् is shown as the equivalent for सुखविशिष्टाभिधानात्. विशिष्टसुखावत्त्वात् is not the dissolution of the compound but it is only the explanation. Because he has happiness therefore he is supreme which means perfect. How do you get the meaning of मनुष्यं or ब्रह्म. Happiness is the nature or essence of Brahman. So by the strength of विशेष, सुख becomes सुखवत्त्व. This is in accordance with the meaning of Brahman which means 'full of' 'perfect with' 'what is it full of?' it is full of happiness because that is near the context. The one in the eye is Parameswara. He is again attributed with full control over Akshi and Aditya. The objector says that he is Agni. But This is only a proposition to be rejected. Hence Sutrakara says अवस्थितेरसंभवाच्चनेतरः

Agni cannot be the controller over Akshi and Aditya. For all the three are Jeevas equally

who require other controllers over them. Thus there is endless regress. So among the Jeevas one cannot be the ruler over others, without the internal guidance of Paramatman. अन्योन्यनियमन is very easily mis understood to be mutual control which is absurd and meaningless. It only means that one Jeeva higher in the eternal scale of inner merit rules over other Jeevas who are lower in scale of natural superiority at the sufference of the highest spiritual Paramatman. Without His inexorable control the universe collapses like a palace of cards. The scale rises to its apex-Para Brahman.

We the souls also submit to this rule of the scale of merit only when the central controller Iswara is there to run the whole administration. This scale of superiority of eternal merit holds good even in Moksha.

But one metaphysical doubt arises in this context. Eternal nature or merit in man unchangeable, cannot be ruled over by anybody. But even the eternal and unchanging nature comes within the purview of Divine Law and Divine rule. Those who contend against this, mean 1) Evidence warrants that the eternal

nature does not submit to any external rule. or 2) Though warranted by evidence it is not believed to be possible. or 3) not found anywhere else. To the first alternative the reply is that there is the evidence of Geeta which declares at the top of its voice that no sentient or insentient is immune from God's control. To the second alternative the reply is that if it is not possible for God to rule over eternally established nature how is God the Over-Lord of creation, with absolute Sovereignty. Even others would be independent.

If even nature submits to the control of God we cannot distinguish nature (स्वभाव) from acquired habit (learnt from others). But God and human nature are co-extensive and eternal. Hence it is the nature of man to be controlled by God. That which he has learnt is not his nature.

Besides without admitting the supreme and central control of God if we accept control of higher beings over lower beings then there would arise [अवस्था and असंभव.] a sort of chaos, and confusion.

Now Jayateerth rounds up the whole argument thus :— Agni is to be found residing in

Akshi and Aditya. Is this statement based on the existence of an independent entity, God, or not based on any such belief in the existence of God? Sutrakara has exposed defects in both the alternatives.

Or making sure that the opponent is an atheist Infinite Regress, and impossibility were shown as the defects in his arguments by the Sutrakara in the former part of elucidation. If the opponent believes in the existence of God why brush him aside and be driven to the worst Regress and impossibility.

The opponent is not a fool but one who has Sruti on his own side intelligently studied. But he is an athiest in the opinion of the Sutrakara.

अंतर्भ्यम्यधिकरणम्

This is a Small Adhikarana consisting of three Sutras. Here the word connotes activity of the type of Control with the abstract thought of inner residence. Brahman being immanent controls the organisation of the body.

Raghavendra explains grammatically the word अलग्नक. ईषन्लग्नलग्नकं (अनर्त्यतगतोक्तात् इतिकप्रत्ययः)क

is suffixed in the sense of 'Littleness'. तत्र अलग्नक
(does not affect in the least.)

विक्षेप is beautifully explained as upsetting of the mind. (मनसः व्याकुलत्वं) or distracted in mind.

Now Raghavendra shows that this Sutra treats a subject which is not treated before. So a doubt is raised that the present topic has already been treated in the previous Adhikarana (अंतरङ्गपक्षेः). Even control is implied in the Sutra because had it not been so the objection of अनवस्थिति and असंभव on the statement of inner control would not have been opportune. Now this Adhikarana is meant to clear some other doubt. In the previous Adhikarana Brahman was said to reside in Akshi and others and to enjoy and to actuate them. But this runs against what has been stated. For one who actuates cannot enjoy as time his actuation entails on him supreme effort, and distraction of the mind. Besides, this statement of inner control and enjoyment runs counter to Shruti Ling and context. What is contradicted cannot be proved by hundreds of arguments.

Now Paramatma cannot be endowed with the activity of enjoyment. For his mind is exci-

ted and agitated. Paramatman's mind is really agitated; because he is engaged in overwhelming efforts. His efforts are tiring him out; for he has under taken to control the whole of the universe. Thus control leads through Sorites or Series of reasonings to the verdict that he cannot enjoy happiness.

Here is a proverbial saying introduced in the course of argumentation. The topic on hand is the control of Aditya by Brahman. He wanted to present this topic on a rational basis so as to convince others. He went and begged some to help him in presenting this argumentation. But that man asked him first to prove that Brahman is an All controller and then he would prove for him 'Brahman's control of Aditya.' This is put in another form. One went to another to ask for oil-cake. The Second man asked the first man a big measure of oil. Oil-cake is अदित्यनियंत्रण. सर्वनियंत्रण is a big measure of oil. One who cannot afford to give oil cake, cannot give a big measure of oil. So one who cannot prove अदित्यनियंत्रण cannot prove सर्वनियंत्रण. So a Brahman subjected to all control is easily harassed with overwhelming distraction of mind and hence he cannot in the least be happy.

But we must bear one thing in mind about Brahman before concluding that Brahman suffers from distraction. For your reasoning holds good only in the case of those things which are independent of Brahman in respect of existence. Such things cause distraction of mind while being controlled. But the world which entirely depends upon Brahman for its existence cannot cause any harassment like distraction of mind to Brahman while being engaged in controlling it.

अदृश्यत्वादि गुणकोषर्षिते— Here Brahman is shown to be अदृश्य which is mentioned in यत्तददृश्यं. Here in this Shruti द्रेश्य means द्रश्य and अदृश्य is shown to be the negative of दृश्य.

Now अदृश्य is negative in form; while Brahman is positive in form. How can these two be one or identical? For Brahman is said to be one with his attributes and activities and अदृश्यत्व is one of his attributes.

This doubt is raised by boldly setting forth that अदृश्य is not at all a negative attribute. For the न् or negative particle in अदृश्य means 'different from' and 'not absence of.' Had it meant अभाव then the compound would have been दृश्यत्वा-

दिगुणकाभाव and not अदृश्यत्वादि. The compound is of the type of असुर or अविद्या.

Here is a bit of grammar which adds a pinch of salt to the whole discussion. In अदृश्य if नञ् means negation then it means नदृश्यः भवति and दृश्य is syntactically connected with the Verb. So the whole compound would have been दृश्यत्वाभावादि and not अदृश्यत्वादि. अनश्वः [Mule] अश्व न भवति. Here अश्व is proposed and denied. Then it has syntactical connection with Verb. So it is अश्व न भवति. In the same manner दृश्यत्वं न भवति and not अदृश्यत्वं भवति and there will be no compound but a sentence.

So अदृश्य means 'different from Visible.' This is अन्योन्याभाव but this is not negative in aspect but it is positive. Hence this can be one with Brahman. For this भेद is of the essence of the substance. In Sidhanta अन्योन्याभाव or भेद is not a Variety of अभाव which has only three divisions^s 1] प्रगभाव, प्रध्वंस्वभाव or सदाभाव.

If अदृश्य means दृश्यविरोधत्वं or contrariety in nature Now what is the sort of contrariety that is available. Is it non existence of both in one and the same place? or is it that is between negative and positive objects? The first alte-

native of non-existence in the same place is not between Brahman and अद्वयम्. For they are co-existent. Between Asuras and Suras there is killer and the killed relationship. This is also discarded as the first one.

The greatest contrariety is to be found between Bhava or existence and Abhava non-existence. Leaving aside this example other Bhava and Abhava are found one and the same.

But there is more of difference than identity between Bhava and Abhava. The Sub-varieties of Abhava are three as mentioned above and there exists difference between them. Only in the case of Anyonyabhava there is identity and not difference. Yet Anyonyabhava is preponderantly great in number as it is found with everything in the world. For every object is in-herently different from every other object in the world. How many differences or distinctions which are all of the nature of thing, are there in the world. Hence the counter entities of Abhava alone are Bhava. All other abhavas are generally or mostly Bavas.

Thus by explaining अद्वयम् as अद्वयम् the whole of the Shruti is explained. But this is not correct

for अणोऽं is not Totpurush but it is Bahuvrihi. Hence each one should be explained differently.

In order to explain these adjectives we commonly say only they are all Abhavas and not their Subvarieties. But this would not work out. For one Abhava [Anyonya] is of the nature of the substance. While another is different from the Substance and so on.

Then why are Pragabhavas and others different from the Substances and why are they not one and the same? Because even when the Substance is not existing or is destroyed these Abhavas are there and hence they are considered different from substances.

Now गोत्राद्यभावत्व must be in essence of the form of Brahman, as this is an attribute of Brahman and Brahman and its attribute are admitted to be one and the same. This cannot be because the thing that has Abhava or negation as its attribute must be Abhava negative and not positive like Brahman. But the grammarians dictate that कृत्तद्धितसमासेभ्यः संबंधान् भावप्रत्ययेन, That which has Abhava for its attribute is Abhava. And Abhavaval lva or the attribute having Abhava need not be negative. Therefore the negation of

Gotra being the attribute of Brahman need not necessitate Brahman to be Abhava or negative. Hence Brahman need not fear to be qualified by an adjective Abhava in form for the grammarians also say संबंधे अस्ति विवक्षायां भवतिमतुबादयः

The question now arises— why do you not admit Bheda or difference between two or Anyonyabhava is the same as the substance? What is the sort of contrariety that is available between the difference and the Substance? If it is of the type of the relation between Positive and negative, and if that is determined by the presence of Negative particle नञ् and its absence then the Virodha is found between एत and अएत. But this अएत is in no way different from एतभेद. So there is no contrariety though there is the presence and absence of the negative particle. Hence there is the breach of that rule.

This breach of rule is found in another instance also. The negation of demerit is said to be merit in such places as अक्रौर्य where though there is negation yet there is no contrariety. For क्रौर्य is the absence of peacefulness; and अक्रौर्य is the absence of the absence of peacefulness which is गुण.

Now it is not merely the display of in agnation that Bheda is said to be one with the

substance. But the Sutrakara also is of the same opinion and hence he uses in the Sutra अद्वयत्वादि-गुणकः words negative and positive in form to qualify Brahman. So words that have counter entity like absence of दोष (दोषाभाव) and words that have no counter entity like गुण are one and the same and hence there is no contrariety (विरोध) yet there is presence and absence of negative particle. Hence there is breach of rule.

If thus it is proved that Bhava and Abhava are one and the same there would be no contrariety of the form of Bhava and Abhava. If this is wiped out of the picture there would be no relation of opposition at all in the conceptual world. Because the opposition between Bhava and Abhava is the bitterest and all other contrarieties wear the livery badge of this royal opposition.

Before proceeding to reply the above question one or two points must be made clear. There is opposition or incompatibility between Bhava and Abhava directly and indirectly through those things between others. Here the question is whether virodha or opposition is to be found between simple unqualified Bhava and Abhava or between qualified Bhava and Abhava. Raghavendra makes the second alternative clear by

giving an instance of this type of opposition. That is between Bhava pot, characterised by potness and Abhava or negation characterised by pot, as its counter entity, there is opposition. When this opposition is the basic opposition for all sorts of minor contrarieties in relationship based on the major opposition and when that major opposition is not accepted there will be no relationship of opposition at all major or minor in the world of Relations.

In the first kind of opposition between unqualified Bhava and Abhava there is no opposition at all. For between Bhava (वृत्ति) and related Abhava (वृत्तिभाव) there is opposition. But वृत्ति is not contradicted by वृत्तिभाव; it is only contradicted by वृत्तिभाव. Hence between related Abhava and Bhava there is opposition only when presence and absence both are related to pot for they are found to be opposed to each other so that either there is pot or there is no pot. Pot and no pot cannot be found in one and the same place. Hence we must take cognisance of this type of opposition and that between a thing and its Abhava and nothing more.

There will be an exhaustive discussion about the topic 'Negation and its relation of identity

and opposition with its object or counterentity ' in the third Adhyaya in Bhaktipada where quality (गुण) and (गुण) qualified are said to be identical and different. So this topic finds a congenial place for development in that third Adhyaya; and not separately here.

This is true no doubt, yet the topic had reached here a very critical stage requiring a special treatment here. Hence the insertion of Bheda or Anyonyabhava is in no way different from the substance, its counter entity, and this is taken up for discussion here. But this topic is so revolutionary in nature that one is likely to find incompatibility and opposition and hence it cannot be passed by. Hence it is taken up for discussion here.

If the other schools do not admit Bheda to be the same as its counterentity, there we shall be landed into logical absurdities. There will be at least two Badhaks against this thesis of the identity of Bheda with its counter entity. Now we must bear in mind Bheda and Anyonyabhava are one and the same. If Bheda is not accepted as identical with the substance then there will be infinite regress.

Some metephyical subtlety is dealt with here. पृथक्त्व (separateness) अन्योन्याभाव (mutual difference) and स्वरूप (essential difference) are one and the same. If these are considered different then there is longer explanation required.

Now these three are shades of the same meaning Bheda or difference. For अन्योन्याभाव is अन्यत्व otherness; भेद is essential difference. पृथक्त्व (as in घटात्पृथक् पटएव different from घट is पट only) separate from घट is the essence of पट. These three words are used as synonyms both by sacred and sewlar writers. They are not together used in one and the same sentence.

If it is explained that these are different yet they are not used together because when one of them is there the other two are invariably found with it. This invariable co-existence or concomitance is the reason for not using these in one and same sentence.

But there is no such rule that words that were invariably concomitant in meaning are not used in one and the same sentence. For क्रियावत्त्व भूतृत्व परत्वापरत्व वेगवत्त्व are used in the same sentence though they are all invariably concomitant words.

But पृथक्त्व and अन्योन्याभाव are distinctly different in meaning and usage. For in the first place one is positive in nature and another is negative. Besides grammar shows difference between these two. If otherness (अन्य) is implicit in पृथक्त्व then by the rule of grammar the ablative must be used अटात् पटः पृथक्. Now in अन्योन्याभाव, 'अटो न भवति पटः' also you shall have to use the ablative. But no such thing happens. Hence पृथक्त्व is different from अन्योन्याभाव. From this भेद which is the essence of the thing (स्वरूप) is different clearly from these two.

Grammar enjoins ablative only when the word अन्य is used and not when its synonym is used. Space does not permit us to go into more details of this discussion.

Hence to think that these three words have different causes for their three different meanings is an unnecessarily lengthy process. So 'one essential attribute settles the meaning of these three words' is a short process coming handy to us for their usage.

Now the question of attributes and substance. Both of them are accepted to be one and the same. Hence no new relation is conceived to relate one with the other. In the same way

अदृश्यत्व, अक्षुत्त्व and other attributes of Brahman are with the essence of Brahman as stated in Shruti. Yet Brahman is वर्ण or qualified and the attributes [अदृश्यत्व and others] are those that qualify. On the one hand there is oneness or अनेक and on the other, there is difference or भेद. Neither of these two that are warranted by valid evidences or instruments of knowledge can be denied verity or reality. To reconcile these two, hence we admit a विशेष [some singular yet essential attribute] in the substance on the strength of which a hypothetical difference is admitted even in identical things.

But the Naiyayikas think that the substance and attribute are different and they are connected together with a relation of inherence. [समवाय] They do not admit any विशेष. Others think that substance is one with attribute and others also different; and thus they explain all usage of difference and identity. A third party thinks Brahman an integrated whole, think that all talk of substance and attributes is the play of illusion by which manyness is super imposed on the unity of Brahman. Hence they look down upon this idea of Vishesha.

Now just as you accept Samavaya to be one and in the substance you accept both unity

and difference along with Visheshana so also you may accept Bhava and Abhava and Swarup along with Vishesha.

For the Vaisheshika सूत्र (तत्त्वं भावेन) states that Samavaya is one and one Samavaya proves to be the cause for the talk of the thing in which many inhere, just as one existence or सत्ता proves to be the cause of the talk of many things existing.

Samavaya is said to be one. This oneness is it the very essence of Samavaya or is it different from Samavaya? If both are different how can oneness reside in Samavaya? If one how are they used in apposition. (समवायः एकः) or how the genitive is used with (समवायस्य एकत्वं) Samavaya. If all this fuss is formal your effort to prove the oneness of Samavaya is insincere and futile.

To avoid all this worry it is better to conceive oneness with विशेषः to cope with manyness keeping unity in tact. So what is the use of conceiving diffence and Samavaya to patch it up? For ultimately we are to take resort to Visheshas to reconcile all these quarrelling elements into a sweet unified substance.

Sidhanta uses the last arrow to hit the concept of Samaavaya. In the sentence समवायस्य एकत्वं while syntactically explaining it we cannot give the meaning of षष्ठि. For in the sentence देवदत्तस्यदंडः the meaning of षष्ठि is 'relationship of master' [स्वामित्व] [in the sentence Devadatta bears the relationship of master to the stick], other than the two relations connecting those two things. But in समवायस्य एकत्वं the connected thing only is the connection or relation; and the relation is not different from the connected thing. But this cannot be adjusted without recognising a Visheṣha which allows a connection or relation to be connected. Hence Viśeṣha must be recognized.

This discussion goes on still, in a zig zag course, some times entering a blind alley and creating a dead lock. But often escaping in a narrow hole stands up rallying all his strength for a fight to a finish. Often Jayateerth gives the longest rope for the antagonist to hang himself on the nearest tree. Jayateertha has great pity on the dis armed enemy and to be chivalrous supplies him with new arms and the debate flourishes in dialectical skill syllogestic argumentation in deftness in the application of rules of grammar, and in marshalling of facts, elucidation of figures,

explanations by the use of profuse illustrations, and in the summoning of deep experiences as evidences. Indeed it is a superb pleasure to participate in these arts of polemic craft.

वैश्वानरः साधारण शब्द विशेषात् - This is the only Sutra that graces this Adhikarana. Vaishwanara is a word in the form of a noun which consists of many signs like cooking and others and it is shown to refer to Brahman and not to physical fire as used in the ordinary talk.

Now we are nearing the end of our second Pada. We must show that the present Adhikarana is fit to find a place in the second Pada. Otherwise the end of the Pada cannot be concluded in a coherent manner.

Still we find the treatement in both Padas not consistent. When such a doubt is raised Jayateerth takes up the subject of consistent inclusion to prove a coherent tratement. Here words that are names in form are shown to refer to Brahman (Samanvaya). This Adhikarana cannot be included in the previous Pada. For it also treats of Samanvaya of Ling words (sign). But it must find a place in either of the Padas. For it is a topic of Samanvaya of words that are

popularly known to connote other subjects than Brahman. Otherwise no such Samanvaya stands proved.

But the word Vaiswanara, if one of names of God it may be shown to connote Brahman by the rule of Antaradhikarana. If it is the name of physical fire it might be shown to connote Brahman according to the rule of Samanvaya in Akashadhikarana. Then it is no use complaining that Vaiswanara stands unconnoted.

This complaint is not limited merely to the connotation of the word Vaiswanara. But all words conventional and derivative right from Anandamayadhikarana to Adrisyatvadhikarana stand unconnoted in the highest sense. For if all words are shown to connote Para Brahman common intercourse through speech will be stopped. Hence to save speech from such a dead lock we must stop this Samanvaya business.

Stopping the Samanvaya business is a greater dead lock. Now this dead lock is cleared in this very Adhikarana in the Sutra साक्षादाप्यविरोधं जमिनिः. Hence this Adhikarana is fit to be treated in this Pada.

Now Acharya winds up the second Pada by stating that words that are popularly known to connote other things than Hari and many conventional words along with words that are in the form of signs (लिङ्ग) connote, through primary connotation, Hari. Words like Vaiswanara also for this reason connote Hari chiefly.

Words through convention refer to other worldly objects than Hari. But that convention is the convention of the ignorant. The other one is the convention of the wise. Hence the convention of the ignorant does not interfere with with the convention of the wise.

- END OF PADA II -

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